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Note
FILING OF AN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CHARGE UNDER TITLE VII
AS TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
APPLICABLE TO A 1981 ACTION:
THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF
Johnson v. REA
There now exist two remedies for employment discrimination:Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a Congressionalremedy, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
recently resurrected as a remedy for private job discrimination by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. REA. The rebirth of 1981 has added little
to the already existing Title VII remedy for job discrimination, however,
and has, instead, increased the work load of an already overburdenedjudiciary, especially since 1981 contains no statute of limitations. The author discusses how the courts have attempted to handle the limitations
problem and suggests an analysis which should be employed in future cases.
He concludes that, because it is extraneous and because of the problems
it creates, 1981 should be relegatedto its pre-Johnson status.

I.
N

INTRODUCTION: THE

Two

REMEDIES

1964, CONGRESS ENACTED TITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act

to give employees a remedy for employment discrimination.'

After a 1968 Supreme Court housing discrimination decision,2 the
courts of appeals began to allow employees to use an old post-Civil
War statute, section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code, as

another remedy for racial discrimination in private employment.3
In Johnson v. REA,4 decided in May 1975, the Supreme Court

sanctioned the appellate courts' interpretation of 1981 and attempted to define the relationship between the now overlapping

remedies of Title VII and section 1981.
Under Title VII, an employee is required to file a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to preserve any relief to which he may be

entitled.5 Under 1981, an employee preserves any relief he may
have by filing a timely action in a court of proper jurisdiction before
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. III, 1973). For a discussion of Title VII, see
notes 8-13 infra and accompanying text.
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). For a discussion of the development of 1981, see
notes 31-34 infra and accompanying text.
4. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (Supp. III, 1973).
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the statute of limitations has run.6 The issue before the Court in
Johnson was whether the filing of the Title VII charge with the
EEOC tolled the statute of limitations on a 1981 action based on
the same alleged incident of discrimination. Such a formulation of
the issue highlighted the tension stemming from the Title VII/1981
overlap.
Employees, employers, and the courts have sizable interests in
the 1981/Title VII relationship. The employee seeks swift effective
relief from discrimination which may thwart his access to a needed
job. The employer has an interest in knowing how his freedom to
deal with employees has been limited and what sanctions may be
imposed on him for exceeding those limits. The courts seek to
provide functional remedies for discrimination for which society has
demanded a particular accommodation of justice. From almost any
viewpoint, then, the precise nature of the two overlapping remedies
is of significant interest.
This Note will suggest that there should be no overlap between
the remedies offered by 1981 and Title VII, for affording both remedies to the employee does not increase his measure of protection
or further the social objective of allowing each individual to earn
a living through honest labor free from the discouraging barriers of
racial discrimination.' In affording the dual overlapping remedies,
the already overburdened courts are creating unnecessary work
for themselves and needless confusion for employers seeking to
clarify the restrictions on employment practices, as well as for
employees seeking an effective remedy for discrimination. The
statute of limitations problems, such as in Johnson, involved in using 1981 as an employment discrimination remedy evidence the
confusion and unnecessary work resulting from the continued use
of both remedies. The courts could avoid these problems by recognizing Title VII as the sole remedy for employment discrimination.
Absent this result, the courts should at least understand the proper
analysis and the problems involved in resolving the statute of limitations issues in 1981 actions.
This Note will discuss the historical development of the two
overlapping remedies and demonstrate that the rather recent development of 1981 as a job discrimination remedy is unnecessary
and potentially wasteful of judicial and party time. The 1981
statute of limitations problems raised in Johnson will then be discussed in a four-step analysis: the general procedure of using state
statutes of limitations for 1981 actions; the possibility of a court's
6.
7.

See notes 64-70, 74-76 infra and accompanying text.
See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
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departing from those statutes because of federal policy grounds;
the method of selecting a particular statute of limitations; and a
consideration of the procedure for utilizing state exceptions to state
statutes of limitations. This analysis will confirm that the current
scheme of dual remedies results in confusion and an overburdened
judiciary, and will illuminate a better approach for remedying discriminatory employment practices.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE

A.

Two

REMEDIES

The Development of Title VII

In order to provide a broad remedy for private discrimination in
employment, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in
1964.8 The statute contained carefully considered legislative compromises necessary to obtain the support of the required number of
lawmakers. 9 These major compromises determined the character
of Title VII and the EEOC. Coverage of employers by the Act was
restricted, certain procedures were required for an aggrieved employee to utilize the Act's machinery, and enforcement of the Act
was left largely to the aggrieved individual.10 When Congress
amended the legislation in 1972, it rearranged the balances struck
in the earlier compromises. Coverage of the Act was extended, procedures were
modified, and the EEOC was given some enforcement
2
powers.1

A litigant's claim under the statute typically proceeds as follows. First, the employee files a claim of employment discrimination with the EEOC. The Commission then notifies the employer
of the charge and investigates. Next, the EEOC attempts conciliation if it finds reasonable cause to believe the charge. Finally, the

Commission, the Attorney General, or the employee may institute a
lawsuit." The employee will receive notification (the "right-to-sue"
letter) that he may institute a court action in three instances: if the
EEOC fails in its conciliation attempts, if the government decides
8. M. SOVERN,
PLOYMENT 8 (1966).

9.
(1966).
10.

LEGAL

RESTRAINTS

ON

RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION

IN

EM-

See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431
E. R. Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial

Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV.

Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV.

56, 58 n.13 (coverage), n.14 (procedure) 1972; Sape & Hart. Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 830 & n.28
(enforcement) (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sape & Hart].
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
12. Sape & Hart 845-80.
13. Id. at 862-64.
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not to sue, or even if the EEOC fails to discover reasonable cause
for the charge. Because of administrative backlogs and lack of
resources, the Commission handles many discrimination charges
simply by sending the right-to-sue letter to the employee when it
is so required. What appears to be largely an administrative remedy
thus, in many instances, ends up in court after little more than the
formality of filing a charge.
B.

The Development of Section 1981

Until recently, it was widely believed that section 1981 did not
apply to private acts of discrimination. This section and its companion, 1982, both originated in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866' 4 which, on its face, applied to a wide range of racially
discriminatory activities by private individuals. The Supreme
Court, however, implied that these sections did not apply in private
contexts for several reasons." At times, the Court suggested that
6
Congress did not intend for these statutes to reach private actions;
or that, since Congress enacted the sections under its enforcement
power in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, state action, not
merely private activity, was required to bring an action.' 7 At
other times, the Court implied that Congress could not enact sections 1981 and 1982 under the thirteenth amendment because the
scope of that amendment was confined to an abolition of slavery,
not "the infliction of an injury upon one individual citizen by
another solely on account of his color."' 8 As a result, despite the
broad language of the section which could be construed as applying
to employment discrimination by the state, 9 the courts did not

14. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
15. Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 615, 615-16 (1969).
16. "This interpretation was based on the argument that § 2 of the 1866 act
was intended to enforce the rights protected by § 1. Since § 2 applied only to
actions 'under color of any law, statute, regulation, or custom,' then § I must be
similarly restricted." Id. at 615; see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
454 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883);
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-17 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
17. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1948); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 318 (1879); Waters v. Paschen Contractors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Ill.

1964).
18. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 18 (1906); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271
U.S. 323, 330 (1926).
19. See Hopkins v. Wasson, 227 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), ajf'd, 329
F.2d 67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 854 (1964) (assumes state action present
where school board was defendant); Barnes v. Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc., 144 F.
Supp. 156 (N.D. Ga. 1956).
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apply 1981 to employment discrimination by private employers.20
Faced with the refusal of the courts to allow litigants relief from
private employment discrimination under 1981, Congress sought to
afford those aggrieved individuals a remedy by enacting Title VII.
Following this initial attempt to legislate a remedy for job
discrimination, the Supreme Court sparked the judicial creation of
another job discrimination remedy. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.,21 the Court held for the first time that the broadly written
language of section 1982 applied to private acts of discrimination.
Petitioner Jones alleged that the defendants had refused to sell him
a home solely because of his race, and sought injunctive and other
relief under several federal statutes, including 1982. The lower
courts, 22 in the absence of state action, denied relief although the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invited the Supreme Court to expand the scope of 1982.23 The Court accepted the invitation by
characterizing language in prior cases, which indicated that 1982
was unavailable in the absence of state action, as dicta 24 and holding
that the language and legislative history of 1982 demonstrated that
Congress intended to reach private acts of racial discrimination.25
The Court also held that Congress had the constitutional power to
reach private discrimination by 1982. Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, relied on the language in the Civil Rights Cases26 to
interpret the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment broadly,
finding that Congress was given the power to determine and to
eradicate not only slavery, but also its "badges, 27 including restraints on 1982 rights to purchase property.28 Stewart reasoned
that the thirteenth amendment was intended to reach the private
20. Payne v. Ford Motor Co., 334 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Smith v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970); Barnes v. Atlanta
Transit Sys., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ga. 1956).
21. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Extensive scholarly material is available on Jones.
For its impact on 1981 job discrimination claims and 1981's relation to Title VII,
see Cohen & Fried, "Multiple Jeopardy" in Employment Discrimination Cases, 31
MD. L. REV. 101 (1971); Herbert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches
to Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 449 (1971); Larson,
supra note 10.
22. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966), afid, 379
F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) states:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every state
and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
24. 392 U.S. at 417-20 & n.25.
25. Id. at 420-22, 429-36.
26. 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883).
27. 392 U.S. at 439-40.
28. Id. at 441-43.
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acts underlying the slave system and that since, unlike the fourteenth
amendment, it contained no state action requirement, Congress
could legislate against the imposition of the badges of slavery by
private individuals as well as by the State.29 Only Justices Harlan
and White dissented, counselling "that by far the wisest course
would be for this Court to refrain from decision and to dismiss the
writ as improvidently granted. 30
In so applying 1982, Jones opened the door for similar application of 1981. Using the rationale of Jones, the lower federal courts
were indeed quick to hold that 1981 as well as 1982 applied to
private discrimination. 3' Section 1981 provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.32
The lower courts reasoned that if Congress intended 1982 to apply
to private acts, as the Supreme Court found in Jones, its intent for
1981 was the same, since both sections were derived from the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Similarly, the courts stated that 1981 was
enacted under Congress' thirteenth amendment power to determine
and eradicate badges of slavery imposed by private individuals as
well as the State. Finally, construing the term "contracts" in 1981
to include employment contracts, the courts held that 1981 applied
to discrimination in employment by private employers. 33 The Supreme Court adopted this line of cases in Johnson v. REA,34 and
granted employees direct access to the courts to present their
claims, thereby avoiding entirely the Title VII procedural path.
Section 1981 had finally arrived, for better or worse, as a fullfledged remedy for private job discrimination.
29. Id. at 438.
30. Id. at 450.
31. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Brown
v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 982 (1972); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th
Cir. 1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. International Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Brady v.
Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Macklin v. Spector Freight
Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
33. See note 31 supra.
34. 421 U.S. at 459-60.
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Neither the lower courts nor the Supreme Court in Johnson
suggested, as had the dissenters in Jones, that "by far the wisest
course" might be to refrain from deciding whether 1981 applied to
private acts of discrimination. Such restraint as to 1981 might
have been quite appropriate, however, for many of the reasons suggested by Justice Harlan in Jones. When both the lower courts
and the Supreme Court in Johnson held that 1981 applied to private
acts of employment discrimination, remedies similar to those sought
by the 1981 petitioners had already become available through
Congress' enactment of Title VII. Just as the fair housing provisions of the 1968 Act diminished the importance of the 1982 remedy
found in Jones, Title VII should have reduced the necessity of
holding 1981 to be an employment discrimination remedy. In fact,
the problems that promise to arise from the Johnson decision are
threatening precisely because there are now two statutes providing
overlapping remedies for the same evil.
One could argue that the position of the dissent in Jones, that
the difficult constitutional questions should be avoided, is not applicable to Johnson because those questions were answered by the
majority in Jones. However, the complexity of a constitutional
question is not necessarily diminished in later cases merely because
it was reached in an earlier one. Upholding Congress' power to
legislate against private discrimination under the thirteenth amendment in Jones was controversial enough without the aggravation of
Johnson's application of 1981. The Court may well have been better
advised not to have breathed life into that old statute.
C. The Needless Development of 1981
As suggested above, the remedies available under Title VII and
1981 are quite similar. In addition, the proof of the plaintiffs case
is practically identical under either statute. In those cases where
one remedy does offer more complete relief, that remedy is Title
VII. It appears, then, that the courts afford no additional protection to an employee from job discrimination by interpreting 1981
to cover private employment discrimination claims. 35 An un35. It is arguable that 1981 is not an extraneous remedy because its coverage
of employers is possibly broader than that of Title VII. Cf. Gonzales v. FairfaxBrewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973). Since the 1972 amendments, however, Title VII's list of exempted employers is quite small, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-I (Supp. III, 1973), although the Act's definition of employer is somewhat
more restrictive. Id. § 2000e (b); Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. at 460.
There is some division of opinion among the lower federal courts as to whether
section 1981 affords relief to white employees who are objects of discrimination.
Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U.
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necessary remedy alone might have been tolerable. However, 1981
is not only unnecessary, but actually harmful to both courts and
litigants.
That 1981 is unnecessary seems clear from the broad remedies
available under both Title VII and 1981. When Congress amended
the remedies available under Title VII in 1972, it generally intended
to provide broad remedial powers to the courts.36 The new section
2000e-5(g) of Title 42 gives a court the power to issue injunctions,
determine appropriate affirmative action or fashion any other equitable relief, and award back pay.3 7 Section 2000e-5(k) provides
for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party when that
party is not the United States or the EEOC.3 8 In a single exception
to its intent to provide for wide remedial powers, Congress limited
back pay awards to the two-year period prior to the filing of the
39
charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
Section 1981 remedies as fashioned by the courts seem to enjoy
a similar breadth. Court decisions have authorized the use of
equitable relief.40 Such remedies would apparently include reinstatement, hiring, and promotion for individuals and possibly affirmative action for groups.41 Damages in the form of back pay
and "extraordinary compensatory damages" for the "severe injury"
that "deprivation solely upon the color of a person's skin causes"
are also available to the litigant invoking 198 1.42 Attorneys' fees
RICHMOND L. REv. 339, 341-42 & nn.25-36 (1976).
Title VII affords broader coverage in that it does afford relief to whites.
Spies v. C. Itoh & Co.,
No. 75-14-867, (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)
(1970); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
Federal government employees who are discriminated against by their employers apparently may use Section 1981 as an avenue of relief. Miller v. Saxbe,
396 F. Supp. 1260 (D.D.C. 1975). Title VII, although it provides a separate procedure for coverage, does clearly extend to federal employees who are victims of
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. III, 1973).
Finally, Title VII covers sex discrimination in employment, but 1981 apparently
does not. Comment, supra, at 341 & n.22.
36. The managers of the House and Senate Conference described the powers
in broad terms. The Conference Committee Report contained similar language.
Sape & Hart 880-81.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973).
38. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
39. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
40. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971);
Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971); Sanders v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1970); see Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
41. Larson, supra note 10, at 97; Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981:
Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 339, 348-49 nn.80-81 (1976).
42. Larson, supra note 10, at 98-99; Comment, supra note 41, at 350-53.
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would also have seemed readily available43 as relief under 1981
until a recent decision of the Supreme Court. Now, such an award
appears more unlikely."
The only areas in which Title VII and 1981 appear to differ,
then, are back pay recovery and attorneys' fees. The back pay
43. Larson, supra note 10, at 101.
44. The American rule is that a prevailing party does not recover the cost of
his attorneys' fees. Comment, The DiscretionaryAward of Attorney's Fees by the
Federal Courts, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 588, 591 (1975). The courts, however, often have
awarded attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff in civil rights actions under the
"private attorney general" exception to the no-fee rule. Larson, supra note 10, at
101; Comment, supra, at 619-23; see Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972).
The rationale of the private attorney general exception was that fees would be
awarded to a plaintiff when plaintiffs should be encouraged to bring such actions,
as "private attorneys general," because they are furthering a public policy or interest and benefitting a class, which it is socially desirable to benefit, through private litigation. Larson, supra note 10, at 101; Comment, supra, at 627-28. The
courts have applied this doctrine to racial discrimination cases by holding that
discrimination was against public policy, that remedying it by private litigation
benefitted the class of discriminatees who ought to be benefitted, and that this could
be accomplished in practically no other way. Larson, supra note 10, at 101; Comment,
supra at 619-23; see Cooper v. Allen, supra; Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,
444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1972) (§ 1982 case); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (§ 1983 state action employment discrimination case).
Recently, however, in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975), the Supreme Court decided that the private attorney general exception to the general no-fee rule was an unwarranted judicial invasion of legislative discretion. The Court reasoned that the federal costs and docket fee statutes
expressed congressional intent to reserve to Congress any fee-shifting, and that
Congress had not authorized the private attorney general exception. In the costs
and docket fee statutes Congress stated what the prevailing party could be awarded
in litigation. Still, the Court reasoned, Congress meant to allow the federal courts
to exercise two older equitable exceptions to fee-shifting because Congress had
not repudiated those exceptions. The case has been severely criticized. For criticism and a general exposition of Alyeska, see Comment, supra, at 645-58.
Of the two fee-shifting exceptions which the Alyeska Court preserved, a court
might be able to use one-bad faith by the defendant employer-to award fees to
the prevailing plaintiff in a 1981 employment discrimination suit: When a litigant
has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons," an equity
court may, to achieve justice between the parties, allow an exception to the no-fee
rule. Id. at 603 & n.107, quoting 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.772], at
1709 (2d ed. 1974). A court may find the necessary bad faith in the behavior of the
defendant out of which the suit arises, dilatory tactics pursued after institution
of the action, repeated failures to satisfy a legal obligation, and so on. Comment,
supra, at 604 & nn. 116-22. However, the courts have required relatively extreme
behavior to satisfy the bad faith test. Some courts have required willfulness, and
the Supreme Court has required fraud upon the court so that "the very temple of
justice has been defiled." Id. at 603-04 & nn.114-15, quoting Universal Oil Prods.
Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946). If an employer in a 1981 suit were
guilty of such gross bad conduct, the court would be able to award attorneys' fees
to a prevailing plaintiff employee under this equitable exception. The Title VII
plaintiff would seem to have a much easier road to travel to recover fees under
section 2000e-5(i). See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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recovery under Title VII, however, may not be any more restricted
than the 1981 recovery as limited by statutes of limitations45 or an
equitable decision of the Court. 4 The extraordinary compensatory
damages available under 1981 might also be awarded under Title
VII pursuant to that Act's grant of equitable powers. As to attorneys' fees, the employee appears better off proceeding under
Title VII, where fees are more readily available.4 7
The similarities between the two statutes are not limited to the
remedies available. The evidentiary elements that must be proved
to support a claim have become virtually identical. Three principles
of proof to support a claim of racial discrimination in hiring have
been developed in Title VII cases: (I) statistical proof of racial
imbalance is sufficient to create a prima facie case; (2) willful intent
need not be proved; and (3) statistical proof of imbalance or perpetuation of past discrimination by even neutral employment practices may be used to support a cause of action. 8
Because of the more recent recognition of the availability of
1981 as a remedy for job discrimination, there has been less time
to develop fully the methods of proof for such a cause of action.
This has caused one commentator to suggest that the courts simply
transplant Title VII proof principles to 1981 actions.49 Some courts
have clearly followed this suggestion, 5° while others have done so
implicitly, consolidating the actions without comment when plaintiffs have made claims under both Title VII and 1981. 5 1 This consolidation apparently assumes that the plaintiff has to prove identical
facts for either claim. Before the widespread recognition of 1981
as an applicable statute affording relief for private job discrimination, courts not desiring to apply 1981 where a timely Title VII
claim had been filed merely stated that the Title VII claim would

45. Larson, supra note 10, at 98.
46. See Sape & Hart 883.
47. Additionally, Title VII grants the employee plaintiff some procedural
advantages unavailable to him under 1981. See note 196 infra and accompanying
text.
48. Larson, supra note 10, at 91, 94-95.
49. Id. at 90-91.
50. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972). In Carter, the court held that intent to discriminate was not
required in 1981 job discrimination cases. The court cited Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), a Title VII case, for the
proposition that statistical evidence can be used to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. See Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 339, 347 (1976).
51. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
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entail the same proof and possible
relief as a 1981 claim and that
52
applying 1981 was unnecessary.
Given the similarities between Title VII and 1981, one can
question the necessity for and wisdom of applying 1981 in the private
context, particularly after a consideration of the problems created
by a 1981 remedy for job discrimination.
D.

Johnson v. REA and the PotentialDisadvantages
of Using 1981

Johnson is at once both the Supreme Court's first explicit adoption of the lower courts' holdings that 1981 is applicable to racial
discrimination in private employment 3 and the Court's first attempt
at solving several of the problems inherent in recognizing this applicability of 1981. Apparently well aware of the number of intricate problems raised by utilizing 1981, the Court carefully limited
its consideration to the single question presented and did not attempt
to solve further the difficulties in applying 1981 to a factual situation
which is also covered by Title VII.
On May 31, 1967, petitioner Johnson filed a charge with the
EEOC complaining that REA had discriminated in its seniority rules
and job assignments. On June 20, the date of his dismissal, Johnson amended his charge to include that he had been discharged because of his race. On January 15, 1971, Johnson received his rightto-sue letter from the EEOC and on February 12, filed the letter with
the district court in satisfaction (by permission of the court) of the
then 30-day requirement for commencing a Title VII action. 4 On
March 18, Johnson's recently appointed counsel filed a "Supplemental Complaint" seeking redress against REA and two involved
unions, not only under Title VII, but also under section 198 15 Although the 1981 claim was first made almost four years after petitioner claimed injury, he argued that since the Title VII charge
tolled the statute of limitations, the 1981 action was timely.
Once it decided that 1981 was applicable to private job discrimination, the Court had to select a statute of limitations to apply to
the 1981 action. Since 1981 itself contains no statute of limitations,
52. Lewis v. Bloomburg Mills, Inc., 7 CCH EMPL. PRACT. CASES
9190
(D.S.C. 1974); Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 83 (D. Colo. 1971).
53. 421 U.S. at 459-60. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47
n.7 (1974), the Court hinted that it was aware of the use of 1981 in the lower courts,
but said no more.
54. Once an aggrieved employee receives his "right-to-sue" letter from the
EEOC, he may commence an action in court against the employer under Title VII.
The time limit has been extended. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. III, 1973).
55. 421 U.S. at 455-57.
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6
the Court followed the usual practice of adopting a state limitation.
The majority accepted the lower courts' use of a Tennessee statute
5 7
specifically applicable to 1981 actions arising within the State.
That statute established a one-year period of limitation so if the
running of the statute were not tolled, the period had already expired. This presented the issue for which certiorari had been
granted: Whether the statute of limitations had indeed been tolled.
The majority further limited its inquiry to the single issue of
whether the filing with the EEOC had served to toll the statute because of some congressional policy in Title VII requiring that the
period of limitations for 1981 be tolled when a charge is filed with
the EEOC. The question of whether the statute had been tolled for
any other reason was thus explicitly avoided. 58 The Court majority
decided that Title VII revealed no requirement that a statute of limitations applicable to 1981 be tolled. For the litigant desiring to
pursue both remedies, Justice Blackmun offered the solution of filing
a 1981 action before the applicable period passed and petitioning
the court for a stay of that action pending EEOC deliberations concerning the Title VII charge. 59
Because of the very narrow holding of Johnson, several questions concerning 1981 were left unanswered. The Court did not decide whether Congress had expressed elsewhere any policy favoring
tolling the 1981 time limit when a related Title VII charge is filed,
did not decide whether any federal judicial policies would favor
such a tolling, expressly refused to decide which statute of limitations of the forum state was applicable to the 1981 action, and did
not determine whether any state exceptions to the statute of limitations were applicable.6 0 The lower courts, however, must resolve
these issues causing substantial work for the judiciary and confusion
for the employer and employee.
If indeed the use of 1981 in private employment discrimination
cases generates such confusion, it is appropriate to ask why the
Johnson court recognized the applicability of 1981. Since the rem-

56. See notes 64-70 infra and accompanying text.
57. 421 U.S. at 462 & n.7. The Court stated that the question of whether the
selection of the particular statute was proper was not before it on the limited grant of
certiorari.
58. Id. at 465. It could be argued as a matter of statutory interpretation that
the Court should have looked to § 1981 alone. It has been the practice of the judiciary,
however, to look to Title VII as well as a source of Congressional intent.

59. Id.
60. As to the last issue left undecided by the Court, petitioner Johnson had conceded, at least implicitly, that there were no circumstances which would trigger the
state exceptions to the statute of limitations. The Court stated that it was leaving
Johnson in this position. Id. at 463.
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edies afforded the aggrieved employee under Title VII and under

1981 are very similar, it does not seem likely that the Court was attempting to preserve any special relief for the injured. The Court
still could have upheld the strong federal policy against discrimi-

nation by restricting redress for job discrimination to Title VII.
Furthermore, when a litigant files a claim under Title VII, a court
faces none of the statute of limitations problems associated with

1981, since Congress established definite statutory limits on a Title
VII claim. 6'

Indeed, the only apparent explanation of the Johnson

recognition of 1981's applicability may be the Court's dissatisfaction with the administrative delays within the EEOC, as Justice

Blackmun suggested in a footnote.62
III.

FEDERAL ADOPTION OF STATE STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS IN

1981

ACTIONS

When Congress enacted 1981, it did not include a statute of limitations applicable to that section. The judiciary has responded by
applying state statutes of limitations to 1981 as well as other federally created rights. 63 Whether the recent legislative development

of Title VII and the judicial extension of 1981 will affect the mode
of establishing a limitation for the expanded 1981 rights is a ques-

tion of major importance now facing the courts.
A.

State Statutes of Limitations in Federal Courts

as Applicable to Federally Created Rights
1. The General Propositions
Before the decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 64 federal courts en-

forcing federal rights which had no prescribed statute of limitations
followed state procedural rules of limitation. 65 Those courts reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act 66 required such adherence,
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d), (f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973); Larson, supra note 10, at
82-83.
62. 421 U.S. at 465 n.ll.
63. Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MICH. L. REV. 937,
988 (1951); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 68 (1953); e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947) (action under federal
statute to hold shareholders of insolvent national bank to double liability).
64. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65. Hill, State ProceduralLaw in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 66, 78-81 (1955) (cases cited in text and footnotes).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), originally enacted as section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply." Id.
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holding that Congress had expressed an intention through the Act
to adopt state statutes of limitations rather than to create limitless
actions. 67 This practice had become a matter of federal common law.
Nevertheless, the courts appear never to have held that the state
statutes must invariably be adopted, especially where there was
a paramount federal policy.6 8 Since Erie the federal judiciary has
continued the same practice of adopting state limitations on federal
actions, adhering to the traditional interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act. 69 In a moment of clarity in which he revealed perhaps
the true rationale for the continued use of state statutes of limitations, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that "[S]tate statutes were chosen
by default."70
It seems that continued adherence to the traditional practice of
adopting state statutes of limitations for federal claims is warranted after Erie. The Supreme Court has suggested that in an
action to enforce a federally created right, federal law applies and
the Erie doctrine is inapplicable, since its command is that a federal court adopt state law only when a state-created right is adjudicated. 71 Furthermore, the Court has characterized the Erie
doctrine as "irrelevant" where the ground of jurisdiction is other
than diversity. 72 Therefore, it appears that a court should feel no
compulsion from Erie to depart from well-developed federal law on
adopting state statutes of limitations because of presumed congressional intent in actions to enforce federally created rights in
nondiversity jurisdiction.73
67. Hill, supra note 65, at 79, citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616
(1895).
68. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895); Hill, supra note 65, at 80;
see text accompanying notes 79-82 infra.
69. 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07, at 742 et seq. (2d ed. 1948).
70. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 229 (1958) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
71. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
The Court cited and distinguished Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947),
where a federal tolling rule was applied to a state statute of limitations in an action
to enforce a federal right. In Ragan, the Court reached a different result in a
diversity action to enforce a state-created right. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 60, at 251-52 & n.36 (2d ed. 1970).
72. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651 (1953); C. WRIGHT, supra note 71, at
252.
73. Despite the hornbook interpretation of the Erie doctrine as stated in the text,
it may be possible to construct an argument that the doctrine requires adherence to
state statutes of limitations on actions where the jurisdiction is nondiversity and the
claim is federally created. The inapplicability of Erie to nondiversity litigation may
not be as settled as it sometimes appears. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity
Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1956); Mishkin, The Variousnessof Federal
Law: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 798 & n.8 (1957). Furthermore, although a 1981
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Application to 1981 Actions

This general approach of adopting state statutes of limitations
for federal claims has provided limitation periods for 1981 actions.74
Within the context of civil rights actions like 1981, however, the
courts need not rely solely on the Rules of Decision Act. Another
statute, 42 U.S.C. section 1988, 75 provides more explicit evidence

of congressional intent. Usually, a court will rely on both statutes
to justify adopting a state limitation-although more heavily on the

former.7 6 Finding some statute of limitations to apply to a 1981
action is not a major problem for a court. Two related difficulties,
however, raise much confusion and present a major problem to the
practicing bar.

Once a court has decided to adopt a state statute

of limitations for a 1981 action, that court must decide which particular statutory limit (that applicable to torts, contracts, etc.) to
utilize. In addition, it must be determined under what circumstances

and in what manner federal policy allows a departure from adherence
to the state act.77
claim is federally created, it might be argued that the defendant's right to enter the
plea that the state-created statute of limitations has run is not a matter "governed by
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress" so that "the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the state." Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Finally, even if Erie were controlling, the analysis under that doctrine for adopting a
state statute of limitations, C. WRIGHT, supra note 71, § 55 at 227, appears to be the
same as that used by the courts presently following the Campbell v. Haverhillline of
cases, notes 68 supra, 78 infra and accompanying text.
74. 2 J. MooRE, supra note 69, 3.07, at 749 n.12; Larson, supra note 10, at 76
& n.l (cases cited).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) states.
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall
be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the
party found guilty.
76. Ammlung v. City of Chester, 355 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
77. The material which follows suggests that the order of analysis for a court
deciding to adopt a state statute of limitations for a federal claim is first to determine
if any federal policy allows departure from the state statutes and then, if no policy is
found, to determine which particular statute is applicable. This order of analysis
makes more sense and is followed in the leading cases of United Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392
(1946), Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895). However, courts on occasion
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Federal Policy Considerationsin Utilizing State
Statutes of Limitations

Federal courts may depart from adherence to state statutes of
limitations because of federal policy considerations. As Justice
Blackmun stated in Johnson:
Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is
not, to be sure, our exclusive guide. As the Court noted
in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S., at 706-707,
considerations of state law may be displaced where their
application would be inconsistent with federal _policy underlying the cause of action under consideration.
In the first of the two following sections, an investigation of the
major case law will be undertaken to determine what sources a
court may search to find relevant federal policy allowing it to alter
or depart from state statutes of limitations in enforcing federal
claims. In the second section, these possible sources will be investigated to determine if there is any federal policy allowing a
court to depart from a state statute when enforcing a 1981 claim
where Title VII is also applicable.
1. How Federal Policy Alters Adoption of State
Statutes of Limitations
The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have suggested
three sources of relevant federal policy which allow a court to depart from a state statutory limit: (1) fundamental differences in
federal and state policies, (2) federal legislative pronouncements
in statutes and other materials, and (3) traditional federal judicial
spheres of action. These same courts also suggest a flexibility in
the manner of departure from the statutes.
As to the first policy source, in Campbell v. Haverhill, the
leading case in the area, 79 the Supreme Court held that blind adherence to state limitations was not required where paramount
federal considerations were present. The Court suggested two such
will first seek to select a particular statute of limitations and then look for a federal
policy allowing departure from the statute. E.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys.,
Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 994-96 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine
Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.16 (5th Cir. 1971). This procedure may
involve unnecessary decisionmaking in the selection of the particular statute. It is
apparently used when the court is more concerned with selecting a statute than with
finding a federal policy.
78. 421 U.S. at 465.
79. 155 U.S. 610 (1895). In an earlier case, McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 270 (1830), the Court declared, with little discussion, that state statutes of
limitation are applicable to federally created rights because of the Rules of Decision
Act.
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possible federal considerations. First, where a state discriminated
against a federal cause of action by a statutory limit, the Court suggested that Congress probably did not intend for such a statute to
be adopted. 80 Second, the Court suggested that the language of
the Rules of Decision Act, that state laws be used "in cases where
they apply," might give federal judges "a certain discretion with
respect to the enforcement of state statutes.'
The Court held,
however, that the particular statute before it did not discriminate
against the federal claim, and that it was not argued that its time
limit was unreasonable.82
As to the second policy source for departing from state limitations, the Supreme Court suggested that federal courts examine
legislative acts to determine if any policy would allow an alteration
of a state limit in an application of that law to a federal claim. In
United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,83 a union sued
the defendant employer to recover accumulated vacation pay required by contract but not paid to certain employees upon discharge. The Court held that the suit was properly instituted under
the Labor Management Relations Act, which contained no statute
of limitations, and that the state statute of limitations applied.
The Court further stated that Congress had expressed a policy of
rapid resolution of labor disputes, but none promoting uniformity of
limitations. Even though the Court did not depart from the state
statute of limitations in this case, it was clear that federal policy
was an important consideration, and that there was freedom to
fashion an independent federal limitations period
when congres84
clear.
was
statute
a
in
expressed
as
policy
sional
A traditional federal judicial sphere of action is the third relevant source of federal policy permitting a court to depart from a
state statute of limitations. In Holmberg v. Armbrecht,85 plaintiff
creditors instituted an action to hold defendant bank shareholders
liable for 100 percent of their holdings under the Federal Farm
Loan Act. That Act created a federal equitable right but no statutory time limit. The Court stated that, where Congress had not
placed a time limit on the enforcement of a federal claim, it left
the fashioning of the remedial details of the claim to the Court.
This power allowed the federal courts to absorb but also to alter
80. 155 U.S. at 615.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 615-16.
83. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
84. Id. at 700-02. For a case distinguished by the Hoosier CardinalCourt,
where the Court found a federal policy favoring tolling of a federal statute
of limitations, see Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
85. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
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the limitations period on an equitable claim when federal policy
was compelling.86 The Holmberg Court recognized an equitable
policy of relief from fraud in the case and held that the lower court
of limitations applicacould "cut down or extend" the state statute
87
ble to the action because of that policy.
There are, then, three rather solid sources of federal policy allowing alteration of state statutes of limitations. Holmberg stands
for the proposition that a federal court can discover such federal
policies in a traditional judicial sphere such as equity practice.
Hoosier reveals that legislative acts may be searched. Campbell
shows at least that fundamental differences in state and federal
policy is another reason for change. The Campbell dictum which
suggested that a court could depart from the statutes in its "discretion" appears not to have been followed; 88 indeed, the courts
are reluctant 89 to alter state statutes when they cannot discover a
federal policy favoring doing so. The cases also illustrate the
wide range of alterations in which a court may engage once a
policy allowing such alteration is discovered: extending, shortening,
or tolling the statute (Holmberg), fashioning a federal replacement (Hoosier), and ignoring the statute (Campbell).
2. Application to 1981 Actions
Where both Title VII and 1981 are applicable, it is necessary
to determine whether any of the possible policy sources suggested
above are present. In this way, it can be determined whether a
court may depart from a state statute of limitations otherwise
found applicable to 1981 actions.
a. Fundamental Differences in State and Federal Policy. The
Campbell Court held that a state statute of limitations which discriminates against a federal claim can be ignored, although that
statute is otherwise applicable to the claim. 90 The Court in Johnson accepted the Campbell premise that a state statute could be
ignored if discriminatory, although it did not decide whether the
particular Tennessee statute (specifically applicable to federal civil
86. Id. at 395.
87. Id. at 398 (Rutledge, J., concurring). For a similar holding by a lower court
cited in the Johnson dissent, 421 U.S. at 470, see Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
88. Hill, supra note 65, at 81.
89. United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701, 703
(1966).
90. This aspect of Campbell has been followed repeatedly. Hill, supra note 65,
at 80-81 n.73.
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rights actions) was in fact discriminatory. 91 Nevertheless, because
Johnson adopted Campbell, employees who find that very short
state statutes of limitations particularly applicable to 1981 actions
have run while they were following EEOC procedures may successfully be able to show that a federal court should depart from those
statutes to preserve the possibility of redress for the violation of
federal rights.
b. Federal Legislative Pronouncements. Since the petitioner
in Johnson argued that the relevant source of federal policy was
the history of Title VII, the Court restricted itself to that source.
The face of the statute exposed no relevant policy and the majority
did not recognize one in the legislative history. Citing the same
documents as the dissent,92 the majority did decide that there was
a congressional purpose "allow[ing] an individual to pursue independently his rights, 9 and that if the individual litigant chose the
truly independent Title VII procedures his individual choice did not
toll the limit on the remaining separate 1981 claim.94 From this,
the federal policy present, if any, would be one of freedom of choice
for the litigant. This policy, the Court suggested, was the same
fundamental policy behind a state statute of limitations-freedom to
exercise or sleep on one's rights up to such a time when this freedom would no longer be fair to the other party. 95 Since the federal
policy in Title VII was thus consistent with the policy behind any
state statute of limitations, the majority perceived no reason to
depart from the state statute of limitations used.
The Johnson dissent, however, discovered from the same
sources a legislative intent to provide "a flexible network of remedies,"96 reasoning that although an individual retained all possible
remedies, he might have to follow a certain order in pursuing those
remedies to preserve the integrity of the different procedures. Since
the Congress established a "network" of remedies, and since that
network required an ordering of remedies to be effective, the dissenters suggested that the federal policy was to fix a priority of
remedies and not to give the litigant free choice. That policy would
require state statutes of limitations frustrating it to give way.
Since the policy would postpone 1981 litigation until after Title
VII conciliatory negotiations with the EEOC were attempted, the
dissenters stated that a state statute of limitations which forces
91. 421 U.S. at 462 n.7.
92. Id. at 459, 471.
93. Id. at 459, quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,48 (1974).
94. 421 U.S. at 461.
95. Id. at 466.
96. Id. at 472.
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an early filing of a 1981 action should be ignored. 97 Johnson thus
brings into clear focus the question of whether there was a federal
policy inherent in Title VII justifying alteration of the state limitations period.
A brief review of some significant points in the legislative history of Title VII helps to clarify the division of the Johnson Court.
On the face of the Act, Congress expressed no federal policy relevant to the question of adherence to the state statute. The history
of the Act, therefore, becomes the prime source for any policy.
But Congress made no explicit pronouncement of an intent to determine the order in which the remedies in Title VII and 1981 should
be pursued. If the Tennessee statute of limitations were to be
tolled, such a policy would have to be found. The search thus becomes one for evidence from which to infer an implicit legislative
intent to establish a policy of ordering.
Throughout the legislative history of the original Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the purpose of Congress seemed to be
mainly a preservation of independent concurrent federal remedies,
not any special ordering of those remedies. During the debates
on the bill, the Senate was aware of concurrent judicial remedies. 98
Senator Clark inserted in the Congressional Record three memoranda recognizing other judicial remedies under federal statutues.
These three documents-one from a group of prominent attorneys
in practice and at academic centers, another from the deputy attorney general, and the third from the Secretary of Labor-discussed
the constitutionality of Title VII. In the analyses, each of the writers also discussed other federal labor legislation offering similar relief.
While inferences from legislative inaction are often misleading,
at least it can be noted that concurrent judicial remedies were
known to the Senate, and yet that body enacted no legislation
altering the existence or independence of those remedies. The
senators also rejected an amendment by Senator Tower to make
the EEOC the exclusive federal agency dealing with employment
discrimination,99 thus expressly refusing to destroy these separate
federal avenues of relief.
During its deliberations on the 1972 amendments to Title VII,
Congress more clearlylo ° indicated its intent to preserve concur97. Id. at 472-73.
98. 110 CONG. REC. 7207-12 (1964).
99. Id. 13650-52.
100. Due to the unusual and confused procedural history of the 1964 Act, including a wholesale substitution for the original bill on the floor of the Senate, the
usual volumes of congressional material expressing legislative intent on a near-final
version of the bill are not available. The Congressional Record thus becomes more
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rent remedies. The legislature also somewhat more explicitly suggested that it did not intend to subordinate the independence of
those remedies. Since by the time of the 1972 amendments the
Supreme Court had decided Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. and
the lower courts had begun to apply the reasoning of that case to
1981, Congress was able to consider specifically the existence and
separateness of 1981 as a remedy. Both the House and Senate
Committee Reports emphasized an intention to continue the existing employment discrimination remedies.
The House Report
specifically mentioned 1981,'01 and the Senate Committee seemed
to suggest that existing provisions like 1981 were truly independent of Title VII: "[T]he Committee would also note that neither the
above provisions regarding the individual's right to sue under Title
VII, nor any of the other provisions of this bill, are meant to affect
existing rights granted under other laws.' ' 2 It is important to
note that the Committee seemingly intended that Title VII could
not affect 1981 by conditioning an action based on the latter on
any particular order in pursuing the remedies.
In other actions and expressions, the legislators further indicated
the intention that concurrent job discrimination remedies continue
independently of Title VII. The Senate twice rejected floor attempts to repeal the post-Civil War Act from which 1981 was derived,'0 3 and the House-Senate Conference Committee rejected the
House bill's language making Title VII the exclusive remedy for
employment practices. 0 4 The managers of the House and Senate
conferees issued statements declaring that the then-existing court
interpretations of Title VII (1964 version) should be retained ex1 5
cept where Congress had expressed a contrary interpretation. 0
The lower federal courts had interpreted the 1964 congressional
intent to be the independence of employment remedies, especially
1981 and Title VII.' °6 Through the conference managers, Congress thus signaled that the courts had correctly interpreted this
intent. This strongly stated congressional intent would seem to
leave little room for a court to infer a legislative policy of procedurally linking the remedies by, for example, making recourse to
important, and congressional intent is correspondingly less clearly expressed. The
1972 amendments are therefore an important source of such intent because they are
not nearly so unusual nor confused. Larson, supra note 10, at 70-71.
101. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1972); Sape & Hart 888 & nn.
403 & 404.
102. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971).
103. 118 CONG. REC. 1526, 1797 (1972); Sape & Hart 888 & n.406.
104. See generally S. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
105. 118 CONG. REC. 7564, 7166 (1972).
106. See Sape & Hart 885-87 & n.388 and cases cited therein.
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the EEOC a prerequisite to a 1981 action.'0 7 Furthermore, Congress also expressed the intention to preserve previously existing
remedies, making it difficult for a court to restrict the availability
of remedies by inferring a legislative intent to put procedural prerequisites on their utilization.
Since Congress never specifically established an order for
pursuing employment discrimination remedies, a court must be willing to infer an implicit congressional policy ordering the remedies
if that court is to find a federal legislative policy allowing departure from a state statute of limitations. This willingness so to infer is the precise division between the majority and dissent in
Johnson.' 8 The majority perceived the explicit congressional
emphasis on the availability of multiple remedies and the strong
suggestion of independence of those remedies, and refused to infer
an ordering, stating that an express legislative statement was necessary. 1° 9 The dissent gave more weight to the overall conciliatory scheme of Title VII and inferred the ordering from Congress'
implied desire to effect such conciliation without an intrusive adversary 1981 proceeding." 0
The legislative history seems to support the majority's view of
refusing to state an order in which the federal remedies were to be
pursued. Congress had suggested that the remedies be independent, so no policy of making the remedies dependent by ordering
their pursuit was implicit. Even if the congressional policy had
not been so clear, an inference of the independence of the remedies
-from the clear Congressional intent to preserve remedies-would
support the majority's refusal to make them dependent unless Congress explicitly so required.
The Johnson majority also seems more in line with precedent
than does the dissent. In United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp."' the Court had been unwilling to imply an overall
107. Most of the courts which considered the possible intent in the 1964 Act of
requiring a litigant to utilize EEOC conciliation under Title VII before initiating a
1981 action held that there was no congressional intention of prior recourse. In
1972, the House and Senate conferees' managers presumably adopted these holdings
when they stated that prior interpretations of Title VII remained in effect unless
Congress had otherwise specified. See note 106 supra. Of course any such intent
in the 1964 Act may be a fanciful, though not unusual, type of statutory interpretation, since the applicability of 1981 did not arise until after the Jones case in 1968.
108. A federal policy contained in Title VII, note 58 supra and accompanying
text, was the only ground on which the majority was prepared to allow a tolling. 421
U.S. at 465. The dissent similarly restricted itself. Id. at 468-70.
109. Id. at 461.
110. Id. at 472-73.
111. 383 U.S. 696 (1966); see notes 83, 84 supra and accompanying text.
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federal policy from the mere existence of a congressional scheme

of treating labor-management relations. From this, the Johnson
Court could also hesitate to infer a federal policy from the mere
scheme of Title VII in order to avoid "the drastic sort of judicial
legislation" against which the Hoosier Court cautioned.' 2 More
recently, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.," 3 a case involving
the relation of Title VII remedies and arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, further support for the majority's
position in Johnson was evident. Although the Johnson dissent
cited" 4 and accurately relied on Alexander for that case's emphasis

on the cooperative scheme of Title VII, the Johnson majority is
more strongly supported by the Alexander holding, which was that
a prior arbitration decision did not foreclose a separate adjudica5
tion under Title VII due to independence of the remedies."
Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court in Alexander,
stated that Congress had expressed Title VII policies of opposition
to job discrimination, 1 6 multiple avenues of relief from it," 7 and

support for arbitration." 8 Furthermore, the Court unanimously
held that these various policies could best be served by permitting
employees to pursue both remedies-contractual and statutory-

unfettered by any judicial restrictions relating to the impact of
one on the other.

Judicial restrictions were additionally unwar-

ranted because Congress intended the multiple remedies for job
discrimination to be independent: "Moreover, the legislative his-

tory of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and
other applicable state and federal statutes.""' 9
112. 383 U.S. at 701, 703.
113. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
114. 421 U.S. at 459, 470-72.
115. 415 U.S. at 59-60.
116. Id. at47.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 59.
119. Id. at 48. Justice Powell supports this statement in footnote 9, citing
Senator Clark's letter, note 98 supra and accompanying text; the rejection of Senator
Tower's amendment, note 99 supra and accompanying text; a similar amendment
during the deliberation on 1972 amendments, H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); the Senate Committee report on the
1972 Act, note 102 supra and accompanying text; and Sape and Hart's article, supra
note 10. However, as discussed above at text accompanying notes 98, 99 supra,
most of these documents and actions support only the congressional intent of maintaining the existence of other remedies. That intent is to be distinguished from the
suggestion in the Senate Committee report and the statements by the House and
Senate conferees' managers. See notes 102, 105 supra and accompanying text.
The latter support the view that Congress also intended the remedies to be independent-Le., not related by procedural restrictions as order of pursuit or impact of
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Johnson is thus quite consistent with the unanimous Alexander
opinion. In Johnson, Justice Blackmun sought to reconcile the
same federal policies. The Court held that the federal policy of
multiple independent remedies for job discrimination could not be
the basis for ordering the remedies and making them dependent on
one another by requiring recourse to Title VII's conciliatory approaches prior to the filing of a 1981 adversary action. Admittedly,
the Johnson Court's approach might neglect the Alexander policy
of promoting arbitration if EEOC conciliation fits within that policy. But, if the policies were competing, the Court had to strike a
balance between them. Since congressional support for multiple
independent remedies was more evident, this policy prevailed. The
precise balance which Justice Blackmun struck did not even entirely
neglect the policy of conciliation since, as he stated, the EEOC
measures would be available to the litigant obtaining a stay of his
1981 action.
It might be argued that in Johnson the petitioner would have
had more available remedies, and the policy favoring multiplicity
would thus be served, if the Court had tolled the 1981 limitation.
Yet, this argument ignores the policy of independence of the remedies. That policy is entwined with the policy of multiplicity. It
might further be argued that the policy of conciliation should surely
favor a tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to the 1981
action because conciliation would be most effective if it occurred
prior to any adversary proceeding. This second argument was
precisely that made by the dissent in Johnson. It ignores, however,
the fact that congressional expression of policy favoring conciliation is apparently nonexistent-the dissent cited no legislative authority-in the face of abundant evidence of legislative intent and
suggestion concerning the other relevant policies. Furthermore,
the argument is based upon a double inference of congressional
intent. The first inference would be to deduce a policy of conciliation from the overall scheme of Title VII. The second inference,
based upon the policy of conciliation, would be to deduce a legislative intent to order the pursuit of remedies to effect conciliation.
This second inference, however, would fail because of the congressional intent to maintain multiple independent remedies. The
failure of these dissenting arguments indicates the solid ground upon
which the majority is based.
The Johnson Court could have examined one other congressionprior resolutions. Of course, that clear intention of Congress to preserve remedies
might alone support an inference of congressional intent to keep remedies independent. See text following note 110 supra.
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al act as a legislative source of federal policy-1981. Neither faction of the Court questioned whether 1981 contained any explicit
or implicit policy upon which a court could base a departure from
an applicable state statute of limitations. Apparently the Johnson
Justices were following accepted practices, for in O'Sullivan v. Felix,
the Court rejected the argument that the rights created by a federal civil rights statute could not be limited by a state statute of
limitations. 120 Thus, O'Sullivan implicitly held that a civil rights
statute akin to 1981 contained no explicit or implicit federal legislative policy making state statutes of limitation inapplicable. The
Court opted for the usual approach of adopting the state122limitation.121 Later courts have consistently followed this practice.
c. FederalJudicial Spheres of Action. A court confronted with
an employee-plaintiff still has one other source of federal policy to
determine whether it may depart from an applicable state statute
of limitations: a court may search for a previous controlling or
analogous federal judicial policy in traditional judicial spheres of
action. In Holmberg v. Armbrecht 1 23 the Court suggested that
recognition of a judicial policy is only possible in a clearly established judicial sphere of action. In that decision, the established
judicial sphere of 124
action was the federal practice of fashioning
remedies.
equitable
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Johnson,1 25 may have attempted
to use the Holmberg analysis. He cited Holmberg in support of
the maxim that "historic principles of equity" can be used to depart from state statutes of limitations 126 and reasoned that filing a
Title VII charge would put a defendant on notice of a possible
1981 suit, so that the 1981 statute of limitations should be suspended.1 27 Marshall assumed that the 1981 rights were equitable
as well as legal. His analysis may be based on the equitable
principle of regarding what is substantially done as done. This
policy, he concluded, required a tolling of the statute of limitations on the 1981 action, for the plaintiff had substantially complied with the requirements for commencing an action. Commencement of an action tolls the statute and was substantially achieved
here because the plaintiff had notified the defendant of his intent
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

233 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1914).
See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
E.g., Ammlung v. City of Chester, 355 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
327 U.S. 392 (1946).
Id.; see notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
421 U.S. at 470, 473, 474.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 473-74 & n.2.
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The majority answered this analysis in a footnote.128

Justice Blackmun noted the burden which a long extension of the
statute during protracted EEOC negotiations would place on a de-

fendant.

Furthermore, he doubted that the policies underlying a

limitations period were substantially met where there was not a
complete identity of the causes of action.

Courts also have traditional spheres of action in determinations
of primary jurisdiction.

29

Here, a court would seem to have a rich

source of judicial policies allowing departure from state statutes
of limitations applicable to federal actions. The Title VII/ 1981
overlap, however, is unlike those factual configurations to which
primary jurisdiction analysis is generally applied. Even if the pri-

mary jurisdiction analysis were applied, it does not embrace judicial policies applicable to the limitations problem in situations such
as Johnson.30
128. Id. at 467-68 n.14.
129. A determination of primary jurisdiction establishes whether the court or
an agency has initial jurisdiction over a given dispute. For a discussion of primary
jurisdiction see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 124
(abridged student ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE]; Travis, Primary Jurisdiction: A General Theory and its Application to the Securities Exchange Act, 63 CALIF.
L. REV. 926 (1975).
130. Regardless of whether under a primary jurisdiction analysis a court defers
to an agency or not, that court will not find a judicial precedent of recognizing a
policy applicable to the Johnson limitations problem. When a court decides that a
litigant must exercise prior recourse to an agency for some type of treatment of all
or part of his claim, that court will ordinarily stay the action pending before it to
preserve litigants' rights-especially against a running of the statute of limitations.
Travis, supra note 129, at 926 n.3 and cases cited therein. On the other hand, when
an aggrieved party first resorts to an agency and later seeks redress in a court of
law, if that court does decide that it has concurrent jurisdiction, it treats the agency
and court remedies separately. Where a court finds that a statute of limitations on a
litigant's administrative remedy has run, it examines the limitations on his judicial
remedy independently, since the remedies are concurrent and not identical. United
States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 70-74 (1956); Travis, supra note 129, at
931 & n.28.
Therefore, within this recognized judicial sphere of action concerning agencycourt relations, it appears that the courts have developed no federal policy allowing
an alteration of state statutes of limitations applicable to a federal cause of action,
whether or not prior recourse to an agency is necessary. A court apparently stays
a pending judicial action if prior recourse to an agency is necessary because the
court does not perceive in the ordering of remedies a federal policy requiring a
tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to the judicial action by an earlier
initiation of the administrative proceedings. If a court did not stay the action, the
statute of limitations would run. Furthermore, in deciding that agency statutes of
limitations have no effect on concurrent judicial actions, the courts have apparently
suggested no connection between the agency proceedings and the judicial statute of
limitations; instead, they have suggested the independence of the two actions and,
it seems, their statutes of limitations. This latter judicial resolution squares with
the Johnson majority's decision on the Title VII/ 1981 overlap. That Court similarly
stressed the independence of the judicial and administrative remedies and, there-
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In fact, a primary jurisdiction analysis is useful only as part of
an inquiry into congressional intent. When Congress establishes a
"specialized administrative tribunal," the legislators seldom make
their statutory purpose sufficiently clear to resolve any conflict between the agency's jurisdiction and previously existing judicial jurisdiction. When this occurs, the courts must develop a system of
"what is necessary to make all the prescribed procedures workable."' 3' The courts then become involved in two processes of
statutory interpretation. One is to determine whether Congress
repealed any pre-existing statutory grants of jurisdiction to the
federal courts. 132 The other is to determine how Congress allocated jurisdiction between the courts and the agency for claims
under the new legislation;1 3 3 i.e., an analysis of primary jurisdiction. In a Johnson situation, where Title VII and 1981 overlap, a
court would invoke primary jurisdiction to determine how Congress had allocated jurisdiction for Title VII claims between the
courts and the EEOC. It should be noted, however, that only under
the inquiry into repealed jurisdiction would a court hope to find any
explicit or implicit congressional intent relevant to the altering of a
state statute of limitations applicable to a 1981 action. Under
the primary jurisdiction framework, the Court would only be examining the relations of court and agency under Title VII.
A court could possibly fashion judicial policies allowing departure from a state statute of limitations applicable to a federally
created right by examining the traditional judicial sphere of statutory interpretation to determine possible repeals of legislation.
For example, a court might determine that, by a later statute,
Congress meant to repeal a previous vesting of original jurisdiction
in a federal district court, and to modify the jurisdiction so it could
not be properly invoked until a later time. In that situation, the
court might find a policy to toll the statutory limitation until jurisdiction became proper in the court. However, any doubt 34 Confore, could find no effect (by way of tolling) of the initiation of the administrative
remedy on the judicial action.
Justice Blackmun, in suggesting his stay mechanism, note 59 supraand accompanying
text, apparently created a mutation of the stay procedure in primary jurisdiction
cases. Ordinarily, as mentioned, a stay is granted if the court before which the
action is pending decides prior recourse to the agency is required. Justice Blackmun
suggested a stay of the 1981 action although prior recourse to the EEOC was not
necessarily required.

131.

JAFFE

124.

132. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936); see Larson, supra note
10, at 65-67.
133. JAFFE 122-23. For an excellent summary of the law, see Travis, supra note
129, at 929-60.
134. As discussed at note 100 supra and accompanying text, the intent of Con-
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gress may have left in 1964 about repealing previously existing
remedies was dispelled in 1972. As discussed above, 3 5 the lawmakers in enacting the 1972 amendments, made it clear that Title
VII was to contain no implicit or explicit repeal of 1981. In the
face of the expressions of congressional intent in the legislative
history to preserve, not repeal, existing remedies, a court could not
expect to unearth a policy to favor tolling by finding an implicit
or explicit repeal.
The Title VII/1981 overlap is not likely to fit within a traditional sphere of judicial action, whether equity or otherwise. Nor
has Congress expressed a policy allowing a departure from state
limitations in either Title VII or 1981. It seems, then, that if a court
is to avoid state limitations, it must find supporting policy from the
differences between state and federal policy. If, for example, a state
were to discriminate against the 1981 claim by enacting an especially
short statute of limitations, a court would be justified in ignoring
that statute. Otherwise, it seems that if the courts are to use 1981,
they must adopt state limitations for those claims except in cases
where those limitations are discriminatory.
IV.

UTILIZATION OF STATE STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS IN

1981

ACTIONS

Once a court decides to apply a state statute of limitations to
a federally created right, it is left with two further questions: (1)
which particular statute of limitations of the state is applicable,
and (2) which exceptions, if any, to the statute are applicable.
The Johnson Court decided to use a state statute of limitations in
a 1981 action, but did not answer the two questions. It is appropriate to consider these questions, since other courts may not be
able to avoid them so easily and since they appear to create most
of the confusion surrounding the Title VII/ 1981 issue.
A.

Which Statute of Limitations Applies

As discussed in Part

111, '136

a court decides whether to adopt a

gress to preserve pre-existing judicial remedies was not altogether clear in 1964.
This led the courts and commentators to analyze Title VII to determine whether it
implicitly repealed 1981. Larson, supra note 10, at 63-67.
135. See notes 103-07 supra and accompanying text. If in 1972 Congress was
still not altogether clear on whether remedies were to be independent, it was at least
specifying that they were to remain in existence, as indicated in the House and Senate
Committee reports, the Conference Committee rejection of the House action making
Title VII the exclusive remedy, and the joint statement issued by the managers of
the conferees.
136. See notes 64-70 supra.
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state statute of limitations and whether to depart from that statute
because of some federal policy consideration. The determination
of which particular statute of limitations of a state applies in an
action to enforce a federal claim is also decided as a matter of
federal law. 137 The approach which the courts uniformly use to select the specific statute is twofold. 138 First, the courts characterize or determine the nature of the litigant's underlying claim.
They then select the state statute of limitations for the state claims
most analogous to the nature of the federal claim. For example,
a plaintiff might sue a defendant state hospital for damages for
wrongful incarceration and detention under a federal civil rights
statute protecting all persons against state deprivations of rights
secured by the Constitution.139 If the court were to select a state
statute of limitations to apply to the plaintiffls claim, it would
probably begin by characterizing the claim as one for damages
for false imprisonment. If the state140 had a statute of limitations
for assault, battery, or false imprisonment, the court would probably
choose this statute as most applicable to the underlying character
of the federal claim.
A crucial step in selecting the particular statutory limit for any
federal claim not limited by Congress is thus the characterization
or determination of the natuire of that claim. Once a court decides
the underlying nature of the federal claim, its selection of the particular state statute may be rather mechanical because of the likelihood that the court will try to pigeonhole the federal claim into
some common law class of actions (e.g., contracts, torts, etc.) and
then apply the state statute applicable to that class. Despite the
importance of the initial step of characterization, the Supreme
Court has reasoned that federal courts should accept the characterizations that state courts have given to federal claims unless
those characterizations are unreasonable or contrary to federal
policy.' 4' In selecting limitations periods for 1981 claims, how137. United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 (1966);
Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1962); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 2d
1154 (1964).
138. United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 704-06; Smith
v. Cremins, 308 F.2d at 189-90; Annot., 98 A.L.R. at 1162-63.
139. E.g., Hoffman v. Wair, 193 F. Supp. 727 (D.C. Ore. 1961). Hoffman dealt
with such a claim by a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
140. A conflict of laws question may arise as to which particular state's statutes
of limitations are to be used. United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1962);
Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1267
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments].

141.

United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966).

A court applying this rule for deciding whether to adhere to a state's characterization
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ever, it seems the federal courts have for the most part been operating without prior state characterizations of the 1981 claims.
Furthermore, the fact that a court, federal or state, has decided
the nature of a 1981 claim does not foreclose future reclassifications. Characterization of the claim begins as a matter of statutory interpretation. If the judicial task ceased at this point, a claim
once characterized under a federal statute like 1981 would rarely
be reclassified since the decision would be a constructional clarification of the statute. However, the nature of a federal statutory
claim often cannot be classified merely from the statute; rather,
the facts surrounding the particular litigant's claim must be examined. If a court has a statute before it which requires a consideration of such facts, that court faces a case-by-case analysis to
determine, in good common law fashion, when prior adjudications
are sufficiently similar to provide guidance. The matter is then no
longer one of mere statutory interpretation.' 42
The characterization given to 1981 by various courts will be
analyzed with two purposes in mind. First, it is appropriate to
consider what statutes of limitations have been applied. Second,
the confusion and extraneous effort resulting from the utilization
of 1981 as a vehicle for employment discrimination relief will be
discussed. The varying and sometimes inconsistent results which
have been reached in the circuit courts are no doubt attributable
in large degree to the method with which the characterization of
1981 actions has been approached.
1.

Various Statutes of Limitations Used

When an employee has a claim for job discrimination under
the 1981 right to make and enforce contracts, the federal appellate
courts have applied various state statutes of limitations to the
action. Since the Johnson Court refused to determine whether a
particular type of statute of limitations was most applicable or if
the particular statute applied in that case was appropriate, the division among the lower federal courts remains. An excellent article
by E. Richard Larson 143 suggests that the diversity of statutes selected has sometimes resulted from confused analyses by the courts.
Ideally, the analysis should classify the nature of the 1981 action
of federal claim would use the same analysis as it uses in deciding whether to depart
from a state statute of limitations.
142. In 1981 claims for relief from private employment discrimination based on
the statutory right to "make and enforce contracts," the courts have not engaged in
statutory construction alone in order to characterize the nature of the claim. See
notes 143-96 infra.
143. Larson, supra note 10, at 76-82.
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and select the applicable statute of limitations by choosing the statute applied to state claims most nearly analogous to the nature of
the federal claim. The courts often have treated the first step of
this analysis only superficially. The appellate courts have applied
one of six types of statutes of limitations-limitations applicable to
contracts, torts, liabilities created by statutes, civil actions not
otherwise provided for, specific federal civil rights actions, and specifically named civil actions-to 1981 actions on varying occasions.
a. Contracts. Despite the fact that the 1981 claim for employment discrimination is based upon the statute's "make and enforce
contracts" language, few courts have adopted state limitations applicable to contracts' 44 for the 1981 suits.1 45 In Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., the Fifth Circuit adopted-in a
footnote-the contracts statute of limitations for 1981 actions generally,1 46 stating, "It is, after all, the right 'to make and enforce
contracts' which is protected by 1981.,',14 Larson has criticized this
analysis as superficial because it does not take into account the nature of the "substantial federal right significantly different from the
common law of contracts."' 48 He explains that the federal right is
different because it "involves not only the loss of the contract, but
more significantly, the insult and humiliation of racial classification,
if not relegation to second-class citizenship."'149 Larson's criticism
is essentially that the court looked only at superficial qualities of
144. E.g., CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 337, 339 (West 1954) (4 years, 2 years);
ILL.' ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 16, 17 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (5 years, 10 years); IND. CODE
§§ 34-1-2-2, 34-1-2-1 (1971) (20 years, 6 years); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544 (West
1953) (10 years); MONi. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-2603, 2604 (1964) (8 years, 5 years);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 213(2) (McKinney 1972) (6 years); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2305.06-.07 (Page 1954) (15 years, 5 years); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953) (6
years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-309 (1955) (6 years).
145. In Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972),
vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Eighth Circuit accepted the parties' agreement
that the Missouri 5-year limitation for contracts was the most analogous period
of limitation.
146. 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.16 (5th Cir. 1971). In that same footnote, the court
went on to say that although the contracts limitation generally applied, different
limitations would apply depending on the remedy sought. It suggested that back
pay statutes of limitations were applicable to claims for back pay and the equitable
doctrine of laches applied to equitable relief sought. In later cases, the court has
reaffirmed that the state back pay statutes apply when "wages and like damages"
are sought. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 924 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Fifth Circuit courts have rarely used the contracts statute of limitations, preferring instead to use other statutes, applicable to the remedies sought, when available.
147. 437 F.2d at 1017 n.16.
148. Larson, supra note 10, at 82.
149. Id.
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the 1981 action, not at the substance of the federal statutory protection.150
Courts accepting the Boudreaux reasoning face still an additional
decision: whether the contract sued upon was oral or written. Since
the period of limitations may vary depending on whether a contract
is oral or written, 51 and since 1981 embraces both types of contracts, a different limitation may apply, depending on the court's
characterization of the contract. Where a litigant is represented by
a union which has negotiated a collective bargaining agreement, it
seems the court must decide whether the litigant is attempting to
enforce that written contract or his own oral contract of employment, if there was one, with the employer, or both. In United Auto
52
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,1
the Supreme Court accepted
a state court holding that the employees' claims for accumulated
vacation pay were not exclusively based on their written collective
bargaining agreements, but also on their oral contracts of employment. The Court therefore accepted the district court's decision
that the Indiana 6-year statute of limitations for suits based on contracts not exclusively written applied to an action based on the
federal Labor-Management Relations Act.
For a court to deny a 1981 litigant relief because his employment contract is not exclusively written seems incongruous, yet
such a result follows when a court reasons as did the Boudreaux
court and ignores the substance of the federal right. Such reasoning invites the consideration of irrelevant facts and is inconsistent
with the policies of the statutes of limitations in which the oralwritten distinction is made. Limitations for oral (or not exclusively
written) contracts are generally shorter than those for written contracts because evidence based almost solely on memories of witnesses fades faster than evidence based primarily on written agreements.1 5 3 The policy underlying the distinction between oral and
written contracts would not seem applicable to 1981 job discrimination suits at all, since the defendant-employer does not defend by
150. Id. at 78.
151. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 337 (written contracts) (4 years), § 339 (oral
contracts) (2 years) (West 1954); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (oral contracts) (5
years), § 17 (written contracts) (10 years) (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE § 34-1-2-2
(in writing) (20 years), § 34-1-2-1 (not in writing) (6 years) (1971); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 93-2603 (written) (8 years), § 93-2604 (not written) (5 years) (1964);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (in writing) (15 years), § 2305.07 (not in writing)
(6 years) (Page 1954).
152. 383 U.S. at 706-07.
153.

Developments 1195 & n.172; see J. WILLIAMS, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS IN

CANADA 5,

46 (1972).
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proving terms of the plaintiff's employment contract, but rather
with evidence of his own employment practices.
b. Torts. Other courts of appeals have selected state tort
statutes of limitations154 to limit the time for initiating 1981 job
discrimination claims. In Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co.,155 the Third Circuit simply cited one of its earlier civil
rights decisions 1 6 as authority for adopting an analogous state limitations period. In the earlier case, the court had applied torts
statutes of limitations, reasoning that the cause of action could best
be analogized to the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and slander. In Marlowe v. Fisher Body, the Sixth Circuit
also reasoned that a 1981 action for the deprivation of civil rights
was primarily one for "the violation of personal rather than property rights." ' 7 That court then applied the Michigan statute of
limitations for
personal injuries to the 1981 employment discrimina58
tion claim.
Larson has criticized courts adopting the Young rationale for
making the same mistake as the Boudreaux court, i.e., failing to
analyze the significant differences between common law rights and
federal statutory rights. 159 Another commentator, however, has
lauded the selection of these limits, since the 1981 action "does
not depend on the conditions of the agreement between the parties,
but arises out of a statute creating personal rights that the defendant
has deliberately infringed." 160 Larson would probably respond that
this analysis correctly recognizes 1981 rights as different from contract rights but incorrectly fails to perceive the difference between
statutory rights and tort rights. Larson staunchly maintains that
the federal statute creates a claim for infringement by discrimination on a unique bundle of rights, including the right to be free
from insult and humiliation caused by differentiation in treatment
because of race.
154.

E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340(3) (West 1954) (1 year); ILL. ANN. STAT.

ch. 83, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (2 years); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544 (West 1953)
(10 years); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2606 (1964) (2 years); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
§§ 214(5), 215 (McKinney 1972) (3 years, 1 year); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.09-.11
(Page 1954) (4, 2, 1 years); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 31, 34, passim (1953) (6, 2, 1
years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1975), § 28-305 (1955) (1 year, 3 years);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5524, 5526 (1958) (1 year, 2 years).
155. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
156. Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1016
(1968).
157. 489 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1973).
158. Id.
159. Larson, supra note 10, at 77-78 n.129.
160. A. Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 470, 499.
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Larson's reasoning leads to the conclusion that no statute of
limitations for claims based on common law wrongs can logically
be applied to the federal claim. He recommends that, to create
greater consistency, the courts adopt either general residuary statutes of limitations or statutes of limitations for liabilities created by
statute for these claims. 161 Such reasoning seems to infuse federal
policy into 1981 via the back door; i.e., although this federal statute
apparently contains no federal policy allowing a court to depart
from 'a state statute of limitations, it does contain a legislative expression of policy that these rights are so unique that a court is restricted in its choice of state statutes. A court which adopted this
reasoning, however, would seem to run counter to the reasoning in
O'Sullivan v. Felix and Campbell v. Haverhill.62 Those cases held
that the existence of federal legislation could not be used to justify a
refusal to apply state statutes. The Campbell Court in fact warned
courts not to "limit the defences [sic] to which the defendant would
otherwise be entitled" by inferring a congressional intent from the
existence of congressional legislation. 63 To limit defenses would
seem to include the act of refusing to apply comparatively shorter
statutes where they are applicable. A decision that the mere
existence of congressional legislation, although not prohibiting the
adoption of state statutes, restricts the court's choice among those
statutes seems incongruous indeed.
Larson's contention that the federal statute is unlike the common
law because it gives the litigant the right to be free from racial
insult and humiliation seems unsupportable in cases where the
state courts have recognized a common law action for a similar
wrong and selected an appropriate statute of limitations. 64 A
court thus should not be faulted for adopting the reasoning of
Young or Marlowe. The decisionmaker could quite correctly decide either that a 1981 job discrimination claim is like the common
law claim for humiliation from racial discrimination, or that it is a
type of injury to the person. The court could then apply either the
limitation used in racial humiliation suits or the general statutory
limit for wrongs to the person.

161. Larson, supra note 10, at 81-82.
162. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
163. 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895).
164. E.g., Wolfe v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 2 Ga. App. 499, 58 S.E. 899 (1907);
see Odom v. East Ave. Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1942); C. GREGORY &
H. KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 960-67 (1969). Cf. Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975), in which the Fourth
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Which of these two a court selects may depend on the type of
limitations in that state.165 Some states have limitations phrased

in terms of common law torts (e.g., for assault and battery, false
imprisonment), 66 other states have limitations for general categories of injuries (such as personal injuries in Marlowe or injuries
to property), 6 7 and still other states have both types of limitations.
In a state where the statutes are phrased in terms of

types of injuries, there may not be appropriate statutes of limitations
that correspond to various common law torts. A court would then
necessarily have to fit the 1981 claim into a category such as "in-

jury to the person." This may not be quite as objectionable to a
critic like Larson, since the broad category was meant to encompass
69
many different types of claims whose characteristics vary greatly.
Applying a tort or injury-to-the-person limitation to a 1981 claim
is consistent with the underlying policies of such limitation statutes. Since personal injuries are proven by memory evidence,
which fades rather quickly, the limitations are usually short.

70

Section 1981 claims likewise are proven in large part by witnesses'
memories. 171 It would not seem improper, therefore, to utilize these

shorter statutes for job discrimination claims.
c.

Liabilities Created by Statute. Still other courts of appeals

have adopted state statutes of limitations for liabilities created by

Circuit held a tort statute of limitations applicable partly because of dictum in Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), that an action for racial discrimination was like an
action for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Comment,
Tile VII and 42 U.S. C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICHMOND L. REV.
339, 344-45 (1976).
165. Developments 1192.
166. E.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-2606 (1964) (2 years).
167. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340(3) (West 1967) (1 year); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 83, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (2 years); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3544 (West 1953)
(10 years); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805 (1968) (3, 2, 1 years); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1975) (1 year); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958) (2
years).
168. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §§ 214, 215(3) (McKinney 1972); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2305.09-.1I (Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 31, 34 (1953).
169. Developments 1194 & n.164.
170. J. WILLIAMS, supra note 153, at 55-56; Developments 1193 & nn.155-58.
171. Although statistics may at times play a large part in employment discrimination litigation, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973), those too are often based on memory. Where the statistics are based instead
on industry records, however, there might be an inconsistency in retaining shorter
limitations periods. Personal injury limitations were also shortened as part of a
policy t6 protect emerging industry. Developments 1193. However, the legislature
might be signaling a departure from that older policy by enacting statutes creating a
cause of action for employment discrimination.
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statute.172 In DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1 3 the Second
Circuit held that the New York limitation for liability based on
statutes applied to actions under 1981. In earlier decisions, the
court had simply stated that "§48(2) of the New York Civil Practice
Act prescribed a . .. statute of limitations for actions 'to recover
upon a liability created by statute', and plaintiffs cause of action
derives from a statute, the Civil Rights Act."'174 The court has
never since seen fit to dispute that uncomplicated logic,'
and
the reasoning is indeed difficult to question. The logic is supported
by Larson. 176 Furthermore, such a statute of limitations is unquestionably intended to be applied to those actions that did not
exist at common law, and suggests a policy that those actions be
limited separately from actions at common law. 17 7 However, the
argument that the statute creates unique rights may be open to
doubt, 7 1 leading one to conclude that if a court perceives the true
nature of the 1981 claim to be a mix of common law rights rather
than a new monolithic right, it would be correct in applying a mix
of limitations for common law rights, rather than the limitation
period for liabilities created by statute.
d. Civil Actions Not Otherwise Provided For. Some circuits
have selected for 1981 claims the general residuary statute of limitations 1 applicable to civil actions not otherwise provided for. In
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,18 ) the Seventh Circuit adopted a
general residuary limit for 1981 actions based on its treatment of
1982 actions. The court's earlier reasoning was that since the federal remedy was supplemental to common law remedies, its limitation was not to be found in statutes applicable to those remedies but
172. E.g., CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 338(1) (West 1967) (3 years); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 93-2607(1) (1964) (2 years); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 214(2) (McKinney
1972) (3 years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.07 (Page 1954) (6 years); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 28-305 (1955) (3 years).
173. 511 F.2d 306, 311 n.8 (2d Cir. 1975); see Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n,
478 F.2d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973).
174. Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1963).
175. Accord, Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1974); Romer v. Leary,
425 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1970).
176. Larson, supra note 10, at 81-82.
177. Developments 1196-97.
178. See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
179. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 343 (West 1967) (4 years); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 83, § 16 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (5 years); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544 (West
1953) (10 years); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2613 (1964) (5 years); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. § 213(1) (McKinney 1972) (6 years); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.14 (Page
1954) (10 years); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (1958) (4 years).
180. 427 F.2d 476, 488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. International Harvester
Co. v. Waters, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
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in the general residuary limitation statute.181 Larson has praised
courts using this approach because they recognize the fact that the
federal statute is broader than the common law, 82 although his
praise and the courts' reasoning are both based on the assumption,
questioned above,183 that the 1981 rights are indeed broader than

common law rights. A state provides such a limitation as a catchall so that no action is unlimited.

84

A court choosing this limit

must thus find-at least implicitly-that no other statute of limitations
is applicable.

In this context, it is appropriate to note that a court

could justifiably find a tort limitation appropriate and never reach
the catch-all limitation.
e.

Federal Civil Rights Actions.

Some states have specific

statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions.185

At the ap-

pellate level in Johnson v. REA, 186 the Sixth Circuit adopted such

a Tennessee statute. Although the plaintiff argued that the statute
was unconstitutionally arbitrary, 8 7 he did not contend that it dis-

criminated against the federal claim in the manner which the Court
88
had prohibited in Campbell v. Haverhill.1
If Johnson had made
this argument, the court could have looked to the time limits afforded similar claims. Even then, however, if the court had had to
characterize the federal claim and select an analogous statute of
limitations because no specific statute applied, the time limit would
have been similar to that afforded by the statute actually used.

Presumably, where no statute is specifically applicable to federal
civil rights actions, a state would not legislate in a fashion discriminatory to federal claims, since to do so would be to discriminate

against state claims and to incur the risk that the limitation enacted
would not be the one selected by the courts.

Tennessee's actions

181. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
821 (1970).
182. Larson, supra note 10, at 81-82.
183. See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
184. The states, unlike the Federal government, must provide some statutory
limit for all civil actions recognized in their courts so that those actions are not
limitless. Presumably, states have comprehended the unfairness to the defendant
of limitless actions and realize that they cannot choose someone else's statutes
"by default." See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
185. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1975) (1 year); VA. CODE ANN. §
8-24 (Supp. 1975) (1 year).
186. 489 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1973); accord, Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 525
F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1975).
187. 489 F.2d at 531.
188. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. In Bulls v. Holmes, 403 F. Supp.
475 (E.D. Va. 1975), the court held that a Virginia statute of limitations specifically
applicable to § 1983 actions would not be applied to 1981 actions since that state
statute was discriminatory against the federal claim.
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bear this out, for in the particular statutory provision in Johnson, 9
the Tennessee legislature provided a one-year limitation not only
for civil rights actions, but also for personal injury, tort, and other
actions. The state legislature apparently was presuming that the
nature of the federal civil rights claim was not that different from
the nature of various common law tort claims. That logic is not
unreasonable, and since other similar actions are susceptible to a
similar time limit, it would seem that the Tennessee statute does
not discriminate against the federal claim. Furthermore, a court
adopting the Tennessee statute would be following the Supreme
Court's counsel in United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
that state characterizations of a federal claim should be adopted
90
where not unreasonable.
f. Specifically Named Civil Actions. Finally, some courts of
appeals have adopted for 1981 claims limitations which a state has
made applicable to specifically designated civil actions. A court
might adopt for 1981 claims such limits because these state claims
are most analogous to 1981 claims. For example, one relevant
specific state limit is that applicable to state civil rights claims
under local civil rights statutes. 19' At least one court has applied
such a state limitation to a federal civil rights action. In Warren
v. Norman Realty Co., 192 the Eighth Circuit applied a Nebraska
180-day limit for housing discrimination suits brought under 1982.
That court reasoned that the "federal action [was] seeking to remedy
' 93
precisely the same wrong condemned by the Nebraska statute."'
The court distinguished the Seventh Circuit's refusal to apply a state
fair employment practices act limitation to a 1981 job discrimination
claim in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, reasoning that under the
state act in Waters there was no direct recourse to a court, thus destroying any analogy between the state claim and 1981.194 In
Warren, however, the Nebraska act afforded direct recourse to the
courts.
The Waters court had also reasoned that the state civil rights
act was not appropriate because its short time period was designed
189. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1975).
190. 383 U.S. at 706. The Court did not specify that only judicial characterizations were to be adopted.
191. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1422 (West 1971) (1 year); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 858(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (180 days); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.200(I)
(Baldwin 1975) (180 days); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 64-308 (Supp. 1975) (180
days); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-119 (1974) (180 days); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.05(B) (Page Supp. 1975) (6 months).
192. 513 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1975).
193. Id. at 734.
194. Id. at 735.
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to encourage conciliation under the administrative scheme of the
act.195 Since no such conciliation scheme is involved in a 1981
claim, the short limitation is unwarranted. This reasoning would
also seem to apply in Warren, since the Nebraska statute involved
a similar scheme encouraging administration conciliation under
threat of quick adversary resolution. Whether the threat of resolution comes from the judiciary as in Warren or the administrative
tribunal with quasi-judicial powers as in Waters seems irrelevant.
It would seem that many of the arguments advanced against
applying Title VII limitations to 1981 claims for employment discrimination would be equally valid against applying limitations in
state acts similar to Title VII. In Young v. InternationalTelephone
& Telegraph Co., the court discussed the availability of such advantages as a court-appointed attorney, waiver of filing fees, permissible entry of the Attorney General into the case, and the award
of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party which are available under
Title VII but not under 1981. The court stated that this difference
justified the extremely short limitation on Title VII which does not
apply to 198 1.196 If a state civil rights act offered similar advantages to a plaintiff, fairness to the defendant would warrant a
short limit on such actions. Since 1981 does not generally offer a
plaintiff such advantages, the short limitation should not apply.
2.

Divisions Within a Circuit

Even when the analysis suggested above of characterizing the
underlying nature of the federal claim and applying to that claim
state limitations for analogous state claims is followed, the court
may reach different decisions on which particular statute of limitations is to be applied. The circuit court might decide differently
on different occasions because of two variables: a difference in the
particular statutes of limitations examined or a difference in the
factual configuration examined.
The Sixth Circuit offers an excellent example of a court whose
decisions vary because of the first variable. That court, like all the
other circuit courts except the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction extending over several states. It thus has several different
state statutes of limitations to examine. For example, in Johnson
v. REA, the Court selected a Tennessee statute specifically applicable to federal civil rights acts, but in Marlowe v. Fisher Body, the
court selected the Michigan injury-to-person limit. 197 In other cases
195. 427 F.2d at 488.
196. 438 F.2d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 1971).
197. See notes 186, 157 supra and accompanying text.
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the court has selected the Kentucky liability-created-by-statute
198
limitation and the Ohio general residuary limitations.
Appellate courts have also found different lifiitations applicable
to the same federal claim within a particular state because of different fact situations involved. As discussed above, 199 both in 1981
and in other federal claims, selecting the appropriate statute may
involve more than simple statutory construction. The federal cause
of action may encompass several possible factual situations analogous to several different state claims with different state statutory
limits. Because of variations in the identity of the defendants,
the grounds for the claim, and the remedies sought, courts considering 1981 and other federal civil rights statutory claims have
varied their selections of statutes of limitations and have even
selected more than one statute for a single federal claim.
In Baker v. F & F Investment,20° the Seventh Circuit held that
different statutes of limitations applied to different defendants in the
same action. Both an Illinois statute of limitations governing claims
against agencies and another applicable to liquidators of savings
and loan associations were applied to a housing discrimination
claim based in part on 1981. The court also reiterated its earlier
decision in a related suit 2° ' that the Illinois general residuary
statute of limitations applied to claims against private defendants,
reasoning that "all the relevant elements of each lawsuit must be
considered before characterizing it for statute of limitations purposes. '' 202 This process seems justifiable where a state has made
certain limits applicable to certain defendants, for if the differences
were ignored, enunciated state policy would be thwarted.20 3 If a
court has not unearthed a federal policy as outlined in Part III above,
it would not be free to thwart the state policy. 20 4 It would therefore not be difficult for different 1981 suits to end up with different
periods of limitations, depending on the particular defendant.
198. Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (Ohio); Garner
v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1972) (Kentucky). In both cases, the court rejected the short statutes of limitations of the state civil rights acts.
199. See text accompanying notes 141-42 supra.
200. 489 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1973).
201. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
821 (1970).
202. 489 F.2d at 837.
203. See, e.g., J. WILLIAMS, supra note 153, at 166-67, 170-73.
204. The analysis in Part III showed that a court should properly consider
federal policy first and, failing to find any, adopt state limits. Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610 (1895), and United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696 (1966) counsel that state limits, where there is no applicable federal policy,
should not be ignored.
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Where a court determines that a single 1981 claim, possibly
against a single defendant, has been brought on several different
theories, it might also apply more than one statute of limitations.
Dividing the claim in this manner is more likely in other civil actions than in employment discrimination claims under 1981. For
example, in Polite v. Diehl,20 5 the court considered the plaintiffs
complaint alleging false arrest, assault and battery, illegal seizure,
and coercion of a guilty plea, as falling under 1981, 1983, and 1985.
It then applied a separate Pennsylvania statute of limitation to each
of these grounds, following the practice of characterizing the federal claim in terms of various common law tort actions.20 6 Again,
the selection of multiple limitations seems justifiable. If the court
was correct in its characterization of the federal right as one whose
nature is essentially a collection of common law rights, it quite
correctly 20 7 selected the statutes of limitations applicable to the
various rights.
Finally, because of varying remedies sought, a court might
select several statutes of limitations for a single 1981 claim or select
different limitations for quite similar actions. The Boudreaux
court" suggested that, although a 1981 job discrimination claim
was generally analogous to a state action on a contract, the contract statute of limitations might not apply if a plaintiff claimed
different remedies. 20 9 The state limitations period applicable to
back pay disputes applied to the extent that the plaintiff sought
damages for loss of back pay, but the doctrine of laches con21 0
trolled to the extent that the plaintiff demanded equitable relief.
This approach of applying multiple limitations seems correct, although it is based on the view that the 1981 claim is ultimately
reducible into discreet state claims. 21' This view is at odds with
Larson, who argues that the federal claim is based on a unique right
created by federal statute. These two positions naturally lead to
two approaches.
205. 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974).
206. See notes 155-56 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 159-64 supra and accompanying text.
208. Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1971). See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
209. 437 F.2d at 1017 n.16.
210. Id. There appear to be two possible reasons for not adhering to state limits
for the part of the claim seeking equitable relief. Analogous state claims in equity
presumably do not have the statutory limits applied as controlling, although courts
might consider them persuasive. Developments 1183-85. In addition, the practice
in Holmberg v. Albrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), of judicial recognition of federal
policy in the traditional sphere of action, equity, might also allow the departure
from the statutes. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
211. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
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The Boudreaux view would have a court reduce the federal claim
to a collection of analogous state-created claims and then adopt
state statutes of limitations applicable to such claims. Such 21a2
procedure would seem required by both Campbell v. Haverhill
and United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,213 in which
the Court warned tribunals not to depart from state statutes applicable to analogous state claims in the absence of federal policy
favoring departure.21 4 Following the Larson view, however, a court
would conceive of the federal claim as unique so that no state claim
analogous to the substance of the federal claim existed. The court
would then probably apply a state's general residuary or liabilitycreated-by-statute limitation, since these limitations apply to state
claims analogous to the 1981 claim in the sense of being unique and
not otherwise provided for. It follows that the possibility that a
court will choose varying limitations periods because of differing
theories of the action or differing remedies sought depends upon
whether the court rejects Larson's argument that 1981 creates only
a single federal right. Even if a court accepts Larson's view, however, as some courts have, 215 it could presumably still vary its selections where certain defendants were specifically covered by express
statutes enunciating state policy.
One must conclude that the possible number of limitations
periods resulting from 1981 claims could be quite large. There are,
after all, several contributing factors; factual variations, different
limitations in every state, and several different justifications for
selecting various limitations periods all contribute to the growing
list of choices facing a given court. When it breathed life into 1981,
the Supreme Court in Johnson left these problems to the lower
courts, thereby perpetuating the present division among the courts
of appeals and the lack of uniformity in the treatment of 1981 actions.
Only if it is presumed that Johnson was correct in recognizing
1981 is this course of action defensible. In essence, the Court refused to impose by judicial fiat a uniform limitations treatment for
1981 actions. This decision is in accord with the judicial doctrines
previously discussed. When courts presume that Congress intends
to adopt state limits, they presume that the legislature has chosen
to eschew uniformity. 1 6 In Johnson, the Court held that Congress
212. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
213. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
214. See notes 141, 163 supra and accompanying text.
215. See notes 173-83 supra and accompanying text.
216. See United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04
(1966); notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text.
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had failed to express a federal policy favoring uniformity when it
enacted of Title VII. Therefore, by its own traditional doctrine,
the Johnson Court could not mandate uniformity in limitations
treatment for 1981 private employment discrimination actions. If
Congress desires to act contrary to this presumption it can enact a
uniform statute of limitations applicable to 1981 actions,2 17 or express a policy by amending Title VII so that initiation of proceedings
with the EEOC uniformily tolls the applicable state limit on a 1981
action. 21 8 Even if it had so desired, the Johnson Court could not
have injected much uniformity into the process of selecting statutes
of limitations for 1981 claims, since many states do not have
statutes explicitly applicable to federal actions. Some other limitation, e.g., the general residuary limit, could have been selected by
the Court, if the Tennessee limit had been found discriminatory
against the federal claim. Even then, however, uniformity would
not be enhanced, since time periods in a given statute vary from
state to state.
B.

State Exceptions to State Statutes of Limitations

When the Johnson Court decided that the filing of a Title VII
charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC did not toll
the state statute of limitations on the 1981 claim based on the same
incident of discrimination, it apparently did not preclude lower
courts from holding that the filing indeed had tolled the statute.
Although this statement may seem contradictory, it is supported
by the opinion, since the Court merely decided that the statute had
not been tolled because of any federal policy in Title VII or, in
other words, that the statute could not be departed from on grounds
of federal legislative policy expressed in Title VII. 219 There is therefore no reason why a lower court could not still find that the statute
had been tolled on different grounds. If a court were to adopt state
tolling provisions and then find that the filing of the Title VII charge
fulfilled one of those provisions for the 1981 action, that court could
hold, consistently with Johnson, that the statute had been tolled.
I.

Adopting State Exceptions

Whenever a federal court adopts a state statute of limitations
for a federally created right, that court also adopts state measures
217. See Comment, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivationof FederalRights, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 763, 769-73 (1968).
218. See Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
219. See, e.g., notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
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for suspending, tolling, or extending the statute. In Barney v.
Oelrichs, the Supreme Court stated "[w]hatever limitation existed
was to be found in state law, and in this instance, in sections 91
and 100 [of the New York Code]."22° Section 91 was the statutory
limit and section 100 an exception to the limit. The Court assumed
that the adoption of state law on limitations included both the time
periods and the exceptions to the running of those periods. Thus,
if no federal policy allowing departure from statutory limits is
found, a federal court can use state exceptions to state statutes to
afford plaintiffs relief from a running of a time limit.
Other courts have adopted state exceptions by referring to the
basic policies inherent in limitations. 2 21 The fundamental rationale
of a limitation is to prevent unfairness to a defendant by preventing
a plaintiff from pressing stale claims. Exceptions to these statutory
periods are a recognition of the balancing consideration: that there
are instances in which the unfairness in barring the plaintiffs claim
outweighs any unfairness to the defendant.222 Therefore, if a federal court adopts a state statute of limitations because of the policy
of fairness, that court should also adopt state exceptions intimately
intertwined with the time limit and necessary to effect the under223
lying policy.
Even if a federal court has doubts about the source of the state
exceptions, those exceptions must be adopted, without discriminating against state judicial exceptions, under the holding of Barney v.
Oelrichs224 and the implications in Johnson.225 Campbell, based on
its interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 226 also supports this
result. State determinations, as the Court in Campbell 227 and Hoosier Cardinal22' advised, should not be altered absent an overriding
federal policy.

220. 138 U.S. 529, 530 (1891). Although decided before Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610 (1895), this case is properly in the Campbell line because M'Cluny v.
Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830), had already decided the issue of adoption of
state limits in the same fashion. In addition, in cases like Johnson, the Court apparently makes Barney part of the Campbell line. 421 U.S. at 464.
221. E.g., Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975); see Developments 118586.
222. 421 U.S. at 463-64; Developments 1220, 1229, 1233.
223. 421 U.S. at 463-64.
224. 138 U.S. at 530.
225. 421 U.S. at 463-64.
226. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
227. 155 U.S. at 615.
228. 383 U.S. at 706.
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Fulfilling a State Exception by Filing a Title VII Claim

According to Johnson, the federal courts are precluded from
holding that Congress expressed in Title VII a federal policy allowing them to favor tolling the statute of limitations applicable to a
1981 action. Those courts may, however, find that the employee's
filing of the Title VII charge meets some state legislative or judicial
exception to the adopted statute of limitations for the 1981 action.
If so, the courts can toll the 1981 time limit in a way not considered
by the Johnson court.
No circuit court other than the Sixth Circuit in Johnson appears
to have addressed the question of whether a Title VII charge tolls a
state exception to a state limit2 29 on 1981. In Johnson, the circuit
court dismissed the plaintiffs argument for tolling on state grounds.
It cited an early case in which it had decided that the "time in jair'
did not toll, under the Tennessee savings statute, the limit applicable to a 1983 action and noted that the two remedies, 1981 and
Title VII, were independent. 230 The court may have reasoned that
the pursuit of one of two independent claims could not affect the
limitation applicable to the other and that the filing of the EEOC
charge did not fit any exception under Tennessee law.
The lower federal courts have apparently had trouble recognizing the possibility-still viable after the Supreme Court's decision
in Johnson-of tolling the 1981 limit on state grounds.23' Of the
229. In Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and
Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971),
the D.C. and Fifth Circuits decided that the filing of a Title VII charge tolled the
applicable state limit because of a federal policy contained in Title VII. Neither
court reached the question of whether an adopted state exception was triggered by
the filing.
230. 489 F.2d at 529-30.
231. In several cases the courts have cited Johnson for the proposition that the
filing of a Title VII charge does not toll the statute of limitations on a 1981 action.
These courts have ignored the possibility that the filing might constitute a state
exception. Dupree v. Hutchins Bros., 521 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Olinkraft, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. La. 1975); Bulls v. Holmes, 403 F. Supp. 475

(E.D. Va. 1975); Brown v. Colman-Cocker Co., 10 CCH

EMPL. PRACT. CASES

10,492 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Williams v. Sheraton Corp., 10 CCH EMPL. PRACT.
CASES
10,446 (E.D. La. 1975); Beasely v. Motor Freight Express, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1975); Adams v. Texas & Pac. Motor Transp. Co., 10 CCH
EMPL. PRACT. CASES
10,402 (E.D. La. 1975); Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber
Co., No. 4708 (D. Del. Sept. 8, 1975); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F. Supp.
403 (,V.D. Pa. 1975); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. I (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Bell v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 9 CCH EMPL. PRACT. CASES
10,157
(D.D.C. 1975).
Some courts have already used Johnson in analogous fact situations, holding
that Johnson indicates that the institution of remedies parallel to 1981 does not
toll the 1981 limitation, and similarly ignoring state exceptions. Guy v. Robbins &
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more widely recognized state exceptions, three are arguably applicable to the filing of a Title VII charge prior to the prosecution of
a related section 1981 action.232 Two of these exceptions, estoppel
and government prohibition of suit, are judicial, while the third,
savings statutes, is legislative.
a. Estoppel. Estoppel as fashioned by state courts within their
equitable powers is an elusive judicial doctrine. Generally, estoppel
works in the following manner: a defendant is estopped from
pleading the statute of limitations as a bar when, through his conduct
or representations, he induces the plaintiff not to prosecute his
known action, and the statutory period expires before plaintiff does
in fact bring his action.233 Some courts have extended the concept
to "any situation in which the plaintiffs reasonable failure to sue
appears to result from reliance on any sort of misleading conduct.
. . .,234 Some courts find that this misleading conduct includes an
agreement by the defendant to arbitrate or enter into negotiations
over a plaintiffs claim when, after the statute has run, the plaintiff
institutes an action to enforce the claim because the arbitration or
the negotiations have failed.235 Under this theory, a court could,
without finding inducement by the defendant, estop the defendant
from pleading the statute of limitations. The majority of courts
find that the mere agreement to arbitrate or act of negotiatingwithout an affirmative attempt to induce the plaintiff to delay inMyers, Inc., 525 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1975); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397
(2d Cir. 1975); Sled v. General Motors Corp., No. 75-71288 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15,
1976); Stansell v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 404 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
Finally, some courts, in circuits where the tolling rule had previously been the
opposite of the Johnson rule have discussed the retroactive application of Johnson
without considering the possibility of using a state exception. Hambrick v. Royal
Sonesta Hotel, 403 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1975); Roberts v. H.W. Ivey Constr. Co.,
10 CCH EMPL. PRACT. CASES 1 10,588 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Bush v. Wood Bros.
Transfer, 398 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Jack v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 10
CCH EMPL. PRACT. CASES $ 10,304 (D.D.C. 1975).
232. The purpose of this Note has been to illuminate the analysis to be used in
applying state limitations to 1981 employment discrimination actions and to reveal
the confusion engendered by judicial recognition of 1981 for such discrimination
claims. For this purpose, a simple illustration of arguably applicable state exceptions is sufficient. A more intensive investigation of a single state's exceptions
which a court might use in the Title VII/ 1981 context is, of course, possible.
233. Developments 1222.
Where a federal court uses a federal equitable rule of estoppel, then under the
analysis discussed, that exception would be classified as a departure from a state
limitation because of federal policy fashioned irra traditional sphere of judicial
action-equity. Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961); see notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
234. Developments 1223.
235. Annots., 44 A.L.R.3d 482, 518-20 (1972); 39 A.L.R.3d 127, 131-32, 13536, 148-49 (1971).
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stitution of the legal action-is not enough for the application of the
estoppel doctrine. 236
In Howard University v. Cassell, the District of Columbia followed the majority rule and required affirmative action by the defendant, holding the "[N]egotiations looking toward an amicable
settlement [were] not enough to bring into operation the doctrine
of equitable estoppel. '237 The plaintiff, an architect bringing suit
for payment for services rendered, had corresponded with the university for three years and was repeatedly assured by the authorities
there that he would be dealt with fairly. Near the end of that
period, the architect and a representative of the university discussed
arbitration of the salary claim. The court held that even if the
parties had actually agreed to arbitrate, the defendant was not
estopped to plead the limitations statute. Quoting one of its prior
decisions, the Court stated, "It is not sufficient, if it should appear,
that defendant failed, or even refused, to appear before the arbitrator and submit its case. Defendant must have done something
that amounted to an affirmative inducement to plaintiffs to delay
bringing action."238
Basing its reasoning on basic statute of limitations policy, the
Howard court found that the university's opposition to the architect's claim was completely unlike the inducement not to sue that
triggers estoppel. The university's action, unlike an inducement,
did not lull the plaintiff into inaction until the statutory period
had run. There was thus no injustice in holding that the statute
had not been tolled. Some courts have also indicated that if a
plaintiff consults a lawyer during the bargaining process, a defendant might not be estopped even if he actually induced the plaintiff
239
to delay.
After the plaintiff consults counsel the question becomes one
of whether plaintiff relied on defendant's conduct or the lawyer's
advice. This question is usually one of fact for the jury. In
Kuntsman v. Mirizzi,240 a California appellate court held that since
236. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. Cassell, 126 F.2d 6 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 675, reh. denied, 316 U.S. 711 (1942) (arbitration); Isaacson v. City of
Oakland, 263 Cal. App. 2d 414, 69 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1968) (negotiation); Hucks v.
Green's Fuel, 247 S.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 149 (1966) (negotiation); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d
127, 136-39 (1971).
237. 126 F.2d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942).
238. Id.
239. See Longo v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 355 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1966); Kuntsman
v. Mirizzi, 234 Cal. App. 2d 753, 44 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1965); LaBonte v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 341 Mass. 127, 167 N.E.2d 629 (1960); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 501-02

(1972).
240. 234 Cal. App. 2d 753, 44 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1965).
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the plaintiff knew of the statute of limitations through her attorney
and introduced no facts to show inducement .by the defendant,
there was no estoppel against the defendant as a matter of law.
The court reasoned that to permit a plaintiff with knowledge of
the limitations to negotiate beyond the statutory period where
defendant's conduct did not specifically induce such prolonged negotiations would "seriously impair the climate and effectiveness"
of out-of-court settlements and the "effect" of the statutes of limitations. 241
A court applying these judicial concepts of estoppel to the Title
VII/ 1981 situation would probably find that the defendant employer was not estopped from pleading the statute merely because
of the employee's filing of a charge of employment discrimination
with the EEOC. The plaintiffs argument would be that the EEOC
conciliation measures are akin to either negotiations or arbitration
and that, if during such proceedings the defendant's conduct misled or induced him to forbear filing a 1981 claim, the defendant
should be estopped from using the statute of limitations as a defense in a 1981 action based upon the same allegation. The employee has an uphill battle to convince a court to accept the line
of reasoning for as the Howard court stated, even a defendant's
refusal to arbitrate after a binding agreement to do so does not
estop that defendant, since such conduct should not induce plaintiff to forbear. Therefore, if an employer refused to engage in EEOC
deliberations, then even if these deliberations were regarded as a
type of "arbitration," the employee could not successfully assert
estoppel. If the employer's attitude is "questioning and opposing"
during EEOC efforts, Howard again indicates that the employee is
not induced to sleep on his rights. Furthermore, the EEOC, like
the private lawyer in Kuntsman, might be regarded as supplying
the plaintiff employee with some legal knowledge on which to
rely. The employee might then not be able to raise estoppel because of his reliance on this knowledge over any conduct of the
defendant.
b. Government Prohibition of Suit. Where governmental action prohibits a plaintiff from filing a timely suit, state courts have
held that it is unjust to penalize him for late filing. Since such
a prohibition, whether by legislative enactment or judicial decree,
often protects the defendant the courts have held it to be fair to
suspend or postpone the applicable statutory limits on the plaintiff's action for the duration of the prohibition. 242 This judicial
241.
242.

Id. at 758, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
Developments 1233.
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solution attempts to balance degrees of fairness and unfairness to
each of the litigants. The defendant, freed for a time from fear of
suit, is amenable to a later, date. The plaintiff must wait with
his claim, but can also press it after the statute normally would have
run.
The government prohibition may be a judicial or legislative
determination that one of the two remedies must be prosecuted
first. For example, in St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. v. Olson,243 the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the time during which the
parties were before a federal agency contesting a claim to land
did not count against the plaintiffs state action for ejectment. The
court reasoned that the statute of limitations did not run during the
federal agency adjudication because courts could not entertain
state suits relating to the' land in question during such an adjudication. In other words, the federal government's exclusive commitment of certain functions to the federal agency constituted
"paramount authority," which prohibited the plaintiff from concurrently exercising his state remedy of ejectment. 2 4
However, the governmental prohibition exception does not
seem applicable to 1981 limitations because of the rationale underlying the Johnson decision. That rationale was that federal policy
did not require a tolling of the 1981 limit in part because 1981 and
Title VII were separate and independent remedies which Congress intended to afford to a litigant concurrently.245 Therefore, a
court following Johnson, i.e., not finding an exclusive federal commitment of job discrimination claims to the EEOC, could not hold
that paramount government authority prohibited the plaintiffs
1981 suit. Consequently, the governmental prohibition rationale
would not provide a basis for tolling the applicable statute of
limitations.
c. Savings Statutes. The third exception to state limitations
periods which may be met by filing a Title VII charge is savings
statutes. In many states, where plaintiffs timely filed claim is
dismissed due to procedural defects after the statute of limitations
has run, these statutes give the plaintiff a specified time after dismissal in which to attempt enforcement.246 In Johnson plaintiff
243. 87 Minn. 117, 91 N.W. 294 (1902).
244. Id. at 120-21, 91 N.W. at 296.
245. See text following note 110 supra. The dissent in Olson used reasoning
analogous to that of the majority in Johnson, inferring that the two remedies in
Olson, an action for ejectment and an action to determine homestead rights, were
separate and independent. 87 Minn. at 123, 91 N.W. at 297 (Brown, J., dissenting).
246. Developments 1243-44.
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argued at both the appellate 247 and Supreme Court 248 levels that
his filing of a charge with the EEOC under Title VII should be
regarded as an initial attempt at enforcement of a claim against job
discrimination. He further argued that enforcement had failed
when his claim was "dismissed" from EEOC jurisdiction by the
mailing of the right-to-sue letter and that the Tennessee savings
statute gave him one year to file his 1981 action.
Savings statutes vary from state to state, but Tennessee's is
typical and presents the usual obstacles for a litigant in Johnson's
position who is trying to qualify under such a statute. It provides:
If the action is commenced within the time limited by
a rule or statute of limitations, but the judgment or decree
is rendered against the plaintiff upon any ground not concluding his right to action, or where the judgment or decree is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and is arrested
or reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or his representatives
and privies, as the case may be, may, from time to time,
commence249a new action within one year after the reversal
or arrest.
The problems a plaintiff such as in Johnson finds in such a statute
are three-fold. First, the employee must convince the court that
the EEOC conciliation procedure is an action within the statute.
That action commences when the employee files his charge and
fails when he receives his right-to-sue letter or when he does not
meet the filing deadline, following the letter, for continuing the
Title VII claim in court. Secondly, the employee must show that
the two possible grounds for failure of the action are grounds not
concluding his right. Finally, the employee would be required
to fit the 1981 claim with the statutory meaning of "new action."
Similar statutes would create obstacles for employees complaining of job discrimination in states other than Tennessee.
The Tennessee courts, like those in other states, have put extended
judicial glosses on the key terms.25 For the most part, the glosses
are liberal and expansive, based on the spirit of the statute "that
a plaintiff shall not be finally cast out by the force of any judgment
or decree whatsoever, not concluding his right of action, without
an opportunity to sue again within the brief period limited. 25'
247. 489 F.2d at 529-30.
248. 421 U.S. at 463 n.9.
249. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-106 (1965) (emphasis added).
250. Comment, The Tennessee Saving Statute, 29 TENN. L. REV. 287 (1962).
See also, 32 TENN. L. REV. 326 (1965).
251. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bolton, 134 Tenn. 447, 455, 184 S.W. 9, 11
(1915); Comment, supra note 250, at 287.
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However, according to the Tennessee courts, an "action" in the
statutory sense apparently included judicial but not administrative
proceedings,252 thereby preventing an EEOC plaintiff from using the
savings statute. Even though the spirit of the legislative savings
statute promotes a tendency to define "action" as broadly as possible, the more fundamental policy of fairness has caused courts
to draw the line short of situations where the defendant has not
25
been put on notice. 5 An informal EEOC procedure in the nature of nonbinding negotiations makes the defendant aware of an
employee grievance and a possible Title VII suit but does not give
the defendant warning to be on guard for claims under 1981.
If the employee plaintiff were successful in meeting the definition of "action," he would more easily be able to meet the other
requirements of the savings statute. The Tennessee courts have
held that grounds for dismissal which do not conclude a plaintiffs
right include, for example, voluntary nonsuits, dismissals without
prejudice, failures to file a declaration, and failures to appear and
prosecute.254 Although most courts require that the plaintiff act
diligently and in good faith,255 they do not stringently enforce
this requirement. If a plaintiff can take a voluntary nonsuit at
any time before a suit is submitted to a judge or jury for a binding
legal finding and benefit from the savings statute, it would seem
that a plaintiff like Johnson should be able to withdraw from EEOC
procedures before they are concluded-if these procedures constitute
an action-and also receive statutory protection. It would not even
make much sense to prohibit the protection after the EEOC had
rendered its nonbinding decision, since the policy of the savings
statute requires that a plaintiff not be "cast out" by a judgment
not concluding his right of action. A nonbinding resolution of a
Title VII charge hardly concludes the plaintiffs right of action
under Title VII, much less section 1981. Of course, if the savings
statute is applicable, it would also be argued that a plaintiff may
not file a Title VII charge in bad faith just to take advantage of
the statute.
Even after hurdling the first two statutory obstacles, a plaintiff
in a state with a savings statute like Tennessee's would still have
to show that the 1981 claim is a "new action" essentially similar
to the Title VII "action" which failed. The Tennessee courts re252. Cf. id. at 288 & nn.11-14.
253. Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 542-43, 260 S.W. 966, 967 (1923);
Comment, supra note 250, at 290 & n.22.
254. Id. at 295-99.
255. Anderson v. Bedford, 44 Tenn. 464 (1867); Comment, supra note 250, at
296-97 & n.64.
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quire that the two suits be "substantially the same cause of action, and the parties in each suit [be] identical. 256 The court's
test requires a definition of the term "cause of action." The Tennessee court has suggested that the term include "all facts which
together constitute the plaintiffs right to maintain the action. 257
Under that definition, the Title VII and 1981 actions would seem
substantially the same since they require the same factual proofs
of discriminatory employment practices. Therefore, it appears
likely that a plaintiff as in Johnson could fall within a savings
statute like Tennessee's if the particular state's courts are willing
to regard the EEOC procedure as an "action" within the statute.
But as the situation in Tennessee suggests, the EEOC procedure is
unlikely to constitute such an action.
In conclusion, while the three specific exceptions discussed are
unlikely to prevail in a Title VII/1981 case, the concept of utilizing
state exceptions holds tremendous potential. The exceptions raise
viable grounds for argument, each of which will ultimately have to
be decided. Again, confusion for the litigants and the courts and
extra work for the judiciary is certain to result from this additional
statute of limitations problem raised by recognizing 1981 as a remedy for private employment discrimination. Courts of appeals
will ultimately have to sort through the various exceptions of the
various states for the various litigants. These problems could be
avoided without excessive harm to employees if 1981 were eliminated as a private job discrimination remedy, leaving Title VII as
the exclusive remedy for such claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recognition of 1981 as a private job discrimination remedy has caused confusion and unnecessary work for
the judiciary. In outlining the framework for analyzing the statutes
of limitations problems involved in a 1981 job discrimination claim
where a Title VII procedure is also applicable, it has been suggested that a court faced with a claim under 1981 should first recognize the general principle that state limitations, if only by default,
apply to federal actions not limited by Congress. Having recognized this general principle, a court should then follow a twopronged approach. First, it should seek specific sources of federal
policy which would allow it to depart from applicable state limitations. Then, if no such policy is found, the court should determine
256. Hughes v. Brown, 88 Tenn. 578, 584, 13 S.W. 286, 287 (1890); Comment,
supra note 250 at 299-300 & n.82.
257. Mattix v. Swepston, 127 Tenn. 693, 697, 155 S.W. 928, 930 (1913).
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which state limitations are applicable and whether there are any
exceptions to those limitations. This analysis would govern the
1981 claim before the court. A court considering which state
statutes of limitations to apply could arguably find several aiplicable to a 1981 job discrimination claim. Courts which have confronted the issue have recognized that more then one limit may be
applicable to a particular claim and that different limitations may
be applicable to similar claims.
Despite the resulting chaos, the courts are all motivated by one
goal: to apply an "analogous" state limitation to the federal claim.
This "analogous" limitation might best be found by determining
the precise nature of the 1981 claim and finding limitations applicable to state claims essentially similar to the 1981 claim. The
court selecting a state limitation must also be aware of state exceptions to state limitations. These exceptions customarily accompany
the limitations and may apply where a Title VII charge has been
filed. Thus, although Title VII provides no federal policy ground
for tolling an applicable state limit, following Title VII procedures
might fulfill a state ground for tolling the limit.
This complex analysis may not be necessary in every 1981 action, but much of it, especially with regard to selecting appropriate
state limits and exceptions, must be done anew by the courts in
each 1981 proceeding. Just why the Supreme Court recognized
1981 as a private employment discrimination remedy, leaving such
a workload for the lower courts left to sift through the confusing
limitations problems, is unknown. This path was not necessary to
insure the availability of relief to the plaintiff employees; a remedy
was being developed for these plaintiffs in Title VII in the 1964
Civil Rights Act. In 1968 the Court began to resurrect the 1866
Civil Rights Act containing 1981, and to apply that Act to private
contexts, despite existing congressional legislation designed to
remedy the same wrongs. Not until Johnson, however, did the
Court accept the complete rebirth of 1981 for private, not just
state, wrongs, despite the fact that Congress had in 1972 made
Title VII an even more potent remedy for employees. There is
little difference between the relief that the employee can obtain under the carefully considered and designed legislative remedy of
Title VII and the relief the employee could obtain under the court's
new-found 1981 remedy.
Why, then, when there was no need for action of this type, did
the Supreme Court adopt an approach which causes such burdensome work for the lower courts. Justice Blackmun may have offered some explanation in a footnote, stating that the Court is "not
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unmindful of the significant delays that have attended administrative proceedings in the EEOC.'

28

Blackmun may have been indi-

cating that the Court thought any trouble in administering 1981
claims was far outweighed by the need of a litigant for an alternative to the often dysfunctional bureaucracy of the EEOC. If this
is indeed the justification for the decision, what does Johnson portend for the future?
It would seem that the opinion is signalling the need for some
internal or external reform of the EEOC. Congress can effect
external reform and control the division of work between the EEOC
under Title VII and the courts under 1981 and can order the
remedies, requiring use of the Title VII procedures before resort
to 1981. Congress could even make Title VII the exclusive employment discrimination remedy. Of course such legislative action without solving the EEOC administrative bottleneck would be
shallow reform. However, coupled with an increase in agency efficiency, such congressional action would be a welcome relief to
the current state of affairs.
On the other hand, the agency could pursue a policy of internal reform, processing claims more quickly and efficiently without
any legislative changes. Should such reform take place, the Court
could reverse the trend of recognizing 1981 and 1982 as separate
remedies, thereby effectively relinquishing jurisdiction to the
EEOC. 25 9 A court could also neutralize Johnson in a more subtle
fashion by making the statute of limitations on the 1981 action less
worrisome to the plaintiff. A plaintiffis costs in utilizing the EEOC
are minor compared with those of instituting a 1981 action. If the
Court abrogated the need for Justice Blackmun's procedure of requiring the plaintiff to file a 1981 action and seek a stay,260 it could
subtly diminish the impact of Johnson and further minimize the
plaintiff's costs, also saving valuable judicial time. The prudent
litigant would then use the agency and go to court only as a last
resort. The Court could give impetus to this tendency by adopting
a single type of statute of limitations for all 1981 claims. By adopting, for example, contract limits, the court could generally insure
litigants sufficient time to pursue EEOC conciliation before the limit
had run, since contract limits are generally much longer than, inter
258.

421 U.S. at465 n.ll.

259. A direct overruling of Johnson's adoption of 1981 for private employment
discrimination would not be as embarrassing to the Court as it might seem. The
Court very summarily accepted the lower courts' use of 1981. It might on a later
occasion explain that, with the opportunity to consider more fully the ramifications

of the applicability of 1981, it finds against the use of that statute.
260. 421 U.S. at 465.
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alia, tort limits. 261 Alternatively, the Court could find a fairly universal state tolling exception, such as a savings statute applicable.
Neither of these court-enforced approaches to uniformity, however, would be in keeping with the Campbell line of cases, which
held that where Congress was silent on limits to a federal claim,
262
Congress eschewed uniformity.
If the impact of Johnson on the courts is to be mollified, one
of two approaches must be taken. Congress must act either to
make Title VII the exclusive employment remedy, or to require
resort to Title VII conciliation before any Court action is appropriate. If Congress were to choose the latter course without taking
steps to make conciliation more effective, the burden would remain
with the courts. Of course, the Court might recognize the problems
created by Johnson and take the wisest course: relegating 1981 to
its former existence as a remedy for state, not private, discrimination.
This would also leave the resolution of the social problems surrounding job discrimination to the political body best suited for
such a task: Congress.
JOHN R. DOROCAK
261.
262.

Developments 1192-95.
See notes 64-70, 141, 163 supra and accompanying text.

